

5


A

SECOND LETTER

TO THE

HON. THOMAS ERSKINE.

[Price Two Shillings.]



A
SECOND LETTER
TO THE
HON. THOMAS ERSKINE.

CONTAINING
FARTHER STRICTURES on his "VIEW of the CAUSES
and CONSEQUENCES of the WAR:"
SOME REFLECTIONS on the Subject of the PRESENT
NEGOTIATION; and OBSERVATIONS on the late
VOLUNTARY LOAN.

With a WORD to the CRITICS, subjoined.

By JOHN GIFFORD, Esq.
Author of "A Letter to the Earl of LAUDERDALE,"
&c. &c.

Fermez l'oreille aux faux rapports; ils peuvent nuire si on les écoute,
mais lorsqu'on les méprise et les rejette, ils ne font que tourner
à la confusion de celui qui s'en promettoit quelque succès.

Le Comte de SCHULENBOURG.

THE FOURTH EDITION.

L O N D O N :

PRINTED FOR T. N. LONGMAN, N^o 39, PATERNOSTER-ROW.

1797:



A

SECOND LETTER

TO

THE HON. THOMAS ERSKINE.

SIR,

A STRONG conviction of the necessity of immediately counteracting the impression which your Pamphlet was calculated to produce, not merely on the superficial and uninformed class of society, but on certain minds of a superior cast, which, building their credit of your political assertions on the respectability of your private character, were liable to be misled with regard to important facts, which they wanted either the means or the inclination to verify, induced me to commit my First Letter to the press, with a degree of expedition that precluded the possibility of pointing out *all* your errors, and exposing *all* your misrepresentations. Unwilling, however, on the subject of a contest, a right understanding of which is so essential to the present and future tranquillity of the country, that any erroneous statements should, under the sanction of your name, acquire the force and authority of truth, I avail myself of the first

B

moment

moment of leisure to supply such omissions, and to urge, as briefly as may be, some farther objections to particular passages, which seem, in a peculiar manner, to require elucidation. In doing this, I shall not seek to preserve a connected chain of argument, but content myself with noticing the different points in the same order in which they appear.

You affirm, that “ America and France began “ their revolutions *upon the same principles* ;” and that “ both governments might have continued “ monarchical, if corrupt power would have submitted to correction’.” An attentive perusal of the French Declaration of the Rights of Men, and the American Declaration of Independence, will suffice to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the first part of your affirmation, by proving the two revolutions to have sprung from different motives, and to have been founded on *opposite* principles². That corruptions and abuses existed in the ancient Government of France, I will readily admit ; and few persons, I believe, were better acquainted than myself with their nature and extent. But so far from any aversion from the correction of such abuses having been displayed by the last virtuous Monarch who filled the throne, the most earnest desire and the fullest intention to promote their extirpation were manifested by him, from the period of his accession to the day of his murder. “ *My greatest desire is to render my people happy,*”

¹ Page 6.

² *Retention* was the principle of the one ; *Destruction* that of the other.

was the first sentence uttered by him in the first Council in which he presided as Sovereign³; and his whole reign displayed the sincerity of his mind, and his fixed determination to reduce to practice the principles which he invariably professed⁴. Had the majority of his subjects possessed a hundredth part of those virtuous feelings which glowed in the bosom of their Prince, France had still been a Monarchy; for the Government perished, not by its own corruption, but by the corruption of its enemies,—by their disregard of every moral and political principle,—by their utter contempt of every religious and social tie.

There is no one circumstance in political controversy more favourable to the purposes of misrepresentation, than a studied neglect in the verification of dates. By the insidious omission to state precise periods, facts, which cannot otherwise be approximated, are easily brought into conjunction; and the triumph of fraud is too often rendered complete by the credulity of indolence. Adverting to the seditious publications of the democratic societies in this kingdom, you seek to afford them an indirect justification, by imputing them to a “just indignation towards the confederacies then forming in Europe:” whereas the fact is, that the publications in question *preceded* the birth of

³ See “Eloge historique & funebre de Louis XVI.” par M. MONTJOIE, p. 131.

⁴ If you will take the trouble to compare any of the Revolutionary constitutions with the plan of reform presented by the King to the States General on the 23d of June 1789, you will find that he offered his subjects a much greater portion of rational freedom than they have since received from their representatives.

the confederacies, none of which were forming at that time. The Emperor's letter from Padua, of the 27th of July 1791, is the *first* step which excited the censure of the French, as it appears from the decree passed against him by the National Assembly in the month of January 1792. And in *April* 1791, the REVOLUTION SOCIETY in London sent an address to the Jacobin Club at Paris, containing the following expressions: "*Royal prerogatives injurious to the public interest, a servile Peerage, a rapacious and intolerant Clergy, and a corrupt Representation*, are grievances under which we labour. But as you, perhaps, have profited from the example of our ancestors, so shall we from your late glorious and splendid actions". Now, Sir, if in these two circumstances the confederacies for the preservation of existing institutions, on the one hand, and the associations for the purpose of subverting them, on the other, you really descry cause and effect, you must certainly admit, that the associations produced the confederacies, since cause must precede effect.

In the same spirit of *accuracy*, you mention the consequences resulting from Mr. BURKE's celebrated Reflections on the French Revolution as one of the circumstances which gave rise to the King's Proclamation, although Mr. BURKE's publication appeared in November 1790, and the Proclamation was not issued till the 21st of May 1792. In order, however, to magnify the conse-

^s Correspondence of the Revolution Society, p. 86.

quence of your Party, and to excite an odium against the Government, you state the immediate cause of that Proclamation to have been the notice given by Mr. GREY, in the House of Commons, of his intention to move for a Parliamentary Reform. Here again you are guilty of a misrepresentation, which a small degree of attention to facts would have taught you to avoid. It was *in the beginning of May, that the Jacobin Correspondence of the Revolution Society*, quoted above, *was first published in the form of a regular volume*; and PAINE's Second Part of the Rights of Man, *combining PRACTICE with Principle*, appeared about the same time, and was industriously circulated by the factious clubs in this kingdom. These were the real grounds of the Proclamation; and the Jacobin Correspondence was pretty distinctly alluded to in the paper itself.

Your artful approximation of remote facts, and your studious omission of intervening circumstances, are remarkable in the following passage of your book: "The Proclamation was planted as
 " the only genuine banner of loyalty; voluntary
 " bodies, to strengthen the executive power, by
 " maintaining prosecutions, were every where instituted; society was rent asunder, and the harmony and freedom of English manners were, for
 " a season, totally destroyed. It was AT THIS
 " PERIOD that the seeds of war were sown⁶." We have seen that the Proclamation was issued on the 21st of May; and the loyal associations, it is

⁶ P. 17.

well known, were not established till November following; and, in the interval, the disaffected societies had sent emissaries and ambassadors to France, to congratulate the rebels on the abolition of Monarchy, and to express a hope that their example might be generally followed throughout Europe. If by "THIS PERIOD" you mean the period of the establishment of the loyal associations, you are so far correct; the seeds of war were then sown; but not because measures of precaution had been adopted in England, but because the National Assembly had previously passed the decree of fraternization on the 19th of November, and had taken those other steps noticed in my former Letter, which actually led to the commencement of hostilities.

You are singularly unfortunate in your selection of authorities for the support of your favourite positions. Alluding to the reforming spirit of the age, in your opinion "*virtuous and laudable*," you observe⁷, "This spirit is at present high in Ireland; and the recent zeal of that brave and virtuous people has completely detected the *false and malicious calumnies upon both countries*. It has demonstrated, that *a desire to reform abuses in the Government is not at all connected with dis-loyalty to its establishment*, and that the restoration of a free constitution, by the wisdom and spirit of a nation, *has no alliance with, but, on the contrary, is utterly abhorrent to a submission to a foreign force*." That there were thousands

⁷ P. 21.

of brave and virtuous men in Ireland, no man in his senses ever presumed to doubt; and that *such men* would fly to the defence of their country, whenever it should be threatened by a foreign foe, every man was convinced. But what has this to do with the spirit of reform, or with the conduct of the reformers? We all know, that the great Reformers and the United Irishmen at Belfast were the only men who refused, when called upon, to second the general zeal, and take up arms against the invaders of the country. And the public will now know, (for a complete History of the Irish Plot, its origin, its progress, its connection, and its object, is, I understand, in the press*,) that what you represent as a *desire to reform abuses* wholly unconnected with *disloyalty*, was nothing less than a conspiracy for subverting the Government and Constitution of the Country, for involving in one general massacre all those who possessed power or property in the Island, and for introducing the accursed code of French anarchy, under the influence and with the assistance of the French Directory, with whom a regular correspondence had been long maintained. This, Sir, will be proved by documents, the authenticity of which even the virulent tongue of faction will not dare to impeach. Such is the *reform* which your Hibernian Patriots, in con-

* Since the above was written, the tract in question has been published under the title of "AN ADDRESS to the NATION, shewing the necessity of forming an armed Association in consequence of the CONSPIRACY of the REPUBLICANS in IRELAND to SUBVERT the CONSTITUTION."

junction with a set of miscreants in England, and in imitation of ROBERSPIERRE, wished to promote in the sister kingdom.

You remark⁹, that the decree of the 19th of November, the nature and tendency of which I so amply discussed in my former Letter, “ and “ the system of which it was a part, *existed only “ upon paper*, and in the inflammatory speeches of “ enthusiastic men, *until confederated Europe began the actual and forcible fraternization of the “ monarchical part of France.*” Here you are again wrong, in point of time, on the other side; for the decree was passed *after* the Emigrants under the French Princes had appeared in conjunction with the Allied Armies under the Duke of Brunswick. Nor is it true, that it was ever suffered to remain a dead letter upon the revolutionary statute-book. It was framed with an express view to a particular case¹⁰; it was followed up, in less than a month, by a second decree, still, if possible, more pernicious; and was acted upon in the Netherlands, and wherever an opportunity offered, without the smallest delay.

Flying back, with forensic dexterity, from the French Decree to the British Proclamation, from November to May, you accuse the Ministers of having *covertly libelled France* in that paper. But you must have been sensible that such an accusation could only be supported by the law principle, so often foolishly misinterpreted and misrepresented,

⁹ P. 25.

¹⁰ The seizure of the Duchy of Deux-Ponts.

and sometimes for factious purposes, that *truth is a libel*. The Proclamation merely stated, that “ there was reason to believe that correspondencies “ had been entered into with sundry persons in “ foreign parts, with a view to forward the criminal and wicked purposes beforementioned” in the Proclamation. The Revolution Society, as I have before remarked, had just avowed their correspondence, with which the National Assembly were acquainted, and of which they had signified their approbation. By a reference to p. 41 of this Correspondence, you may see the resolutions of that Society, dated July 20th, 1790, and transmitted by Lord STANHOPE, their President, to the National Assembly of France. One of the resolutions is couched in these terms, “ *That this Meeting do consider the correspondence which has been “ maintained by the Committee, in the name of the “ Society, with the Patriots of France, as highly “ honourable to this Society, and to the national “ character; and they trust it will produce the “ happiest effects in continuing the friendship that “ subsists between the two Countries, and in “ animating the Sons of Freedom to assert their “ rights among all the nations of the earth.*” The answer, signed TREILHARD, President of the National Assembly, is to be found in pp. 46, 47. of the same publication. After lamenting, indirectly, that the French Revolution did not meet with its just estimation from the Government of Great Britain, and wishing for the happy day when “ Nations shall blush at that perfidious science “ *which*

“ *which has been decorated with the name of politics,*” he proceeds to observe, “ *it is for men like you,*” “ *my Lord, it is for the worthy Members of your*” “ *Society that it is reserved to hasten this new re-*” “ *volution ;*” and the President concludes with expressing the strongest approbation of the Assembly on the Resolutions addressed to them by Lord Stanhope.

I before declined entering upon any discussion of the note presented by M. CHAUVELIN to Lord GRENVILLE on the 21st of May 1792, which you seem to consider as entitled to almost the same degree of credit as holy writ, because the unfortunate king, in whose name it was delivered, was at that time to all intents and purposes a prisoner, surrounded by Jacobin Ministers, who made him utter whatever the National Assembly thought proper to dictate. You take for granted the truth of the statement in the note, that *a great conspiracy had been formed in Europe against France*, and that *troops had assembled on her frontiers evidently for the purpose of constraining her inhabitants to alter the form of the Government they had chosen*. I have already said enough of the Declaration of PILNITZ, and of the circumstances which preceded and followed it, to establish the falsehood of these assertions : and if you had taken the trouble to read the debates of the National Assembly which led to the war, you would have been enabled to discover the truth. The members of that Assembly well knew the league, thus stigmatized, to be purely defensive. As to the collection of troops by the Emperor on

the frontiers of France, so far from that circumstance affording any real ground for apprehension to the party who were anxious for war, it is notorious that the magnitude of the French force on the frontiers, stated to amount to 100,000 men, and the extreme weakness of the Imperial army, had constituted one of the principal arguments used by BRISOT on the 15th January 1792, for persuading the government to declare war.

The note proceeds to disavow all French emissaries employed in procuring proselytes in foreign States, which, it justly observes, *would be a real violation of the law of nations*; and, alluding to the insinuations contained in the British Proclamation, that a correspondence had been carried on by disaffected persons here with certain French subjects, explicitly declares it to be *a proceeding wholly foreign to the French nation and to the Legislative Body,—a proceeding of which they are entirely ignorant, which militates against every principle of justice, and which, whenever it became known, would be universally condemned in France.* Yet had the Revolution Society communicated to the *National Assembly*, in July 1790, their correspondence with the Jacobin Clubs of France, and *were loudly applauded!!!* In the preceding month also, that revolutionary maniac ANACHARSIS CLOOTS, and his motley train of *Ambassadors*, as he called them, from all the nations of the earth, were told by the President of the National Assembly to return home and *make revolutions in their respective countries!!!*—But such is the faith you repose in
the

the veracity of Gallic Jacobins, that you receive all this impudent combination of recorded falsehoods as if it were pure gospel.

In tracing your errors, misrepresentations, and perversions, the mind is absolutely lost in amazement at their frequency and grossness ; and it is scarcely possible to conceive how a publication, which, I am credibly informed, was submitted to the judgment of your party before it was sent to the press, could be ushered to the world in such a state. Adverting to the refusal of the British Government to mediate between the Belligerent Powers, accompanied by an avowal of their determination not to interfere with the internal affairs of France, you say¹¹, this paper "*was written ONLY* " A FEW DAYS *before* M. CHAUVELIN *was ordered* " *to quit the kingdom.*" Lord GRENVILLE's note, here quoted, was written on the 8th of July 1792, and the order for M. CHAUVELIN to quit the kingdom was delivered to him on the 24th of January 1793!!!—*A few days!*—Your pen seems to operate as a kind of *political Telescope*, by means of which you approximate or remove objects as it suits your argument to magnify or diminish them.

I should certainly deem it necessary to expose this strange confusion of dates, were it only for the purpose of proving your shameful inattention to your subject, and your consequent incompetency to discuss it. But I have a farther object to promote by the detection of your mis-statements ; to discon-

¹¹ P. 35.

nect the whole chain of your reasoning, and to destroy the very groundwork of your arguments. It might be urged by your apologists that the error I have last noticed by no means affects the solidity of your inference, which is the establishment of a difference between the professions and the practice of the British Government, by stating that only a few days after they had expressed their determination not to interfere with the internal affairs of France, they ordered M. CHAUVELIN to quit the kingdom, *under circumstances of direct interference*; therefore by substituting *months* for *days* the error would be removed and the fact remain the same. But that is not the case, for by the approximation of remote facts you artfully sink all the *intervening* circumstances. Thus, admitting, for the sake of argument, that CHAUVELIN's dismissal was really an act of interference, as you state it to be; still I contend, that the circumstances which occurred in the interval between the delivery of Lord GRENVILLE's note and the order for CHAUVELIN's departure, afforded a complete justification of the measure. At all events, it is certain the conduct of Government in this respect was regulated by those circumstances; and this, indeed, you afterwards acknowledge, so that your charge of interference might be just, and yet the consequence you draw from it false and unjust.—But, before you ventured to represent the dismissal of CHAUVELIN as an act of interference in the internal affairs of France, you would have done well to consider the conduct of the French Republicans themselves towards

towards the Ambassadors of America, Tuscany, Geneva, Genoa, and Venice. These, though the Sovereigns whom they represented were at peace and in alliance with the French, and though they had been received and acknowledged in their diplomatic capacity, were dismissed in an arbitrary and contumelious manner. CHAUVELIN's letters of credence from his new masters had never been received; his public functions had ceased; he remained here merely upon sufferance in a private capacity; and his dismissal from the kingdom as an alien could not possibly be regarded as an interference in the domestic Government of his country.

Continuing in the same strain and in the same spirit, you remark that the refusal to mediate with the Emperor was given *at the very same moment that we were involving* Holland in the horrors of war! Here again you bring seasons in conjunction which Nature has kept separate, and make summer and winter appear *at the very same moment*; for certain it is that no steps were taken to assist Holland until the winter was far advanced; and equally certain, that the defence of an Ally against the actual attack of an enemy is a singular mode of *involving her* in a war.

After the deposition of Louis XVI. and the establishment of a Republic, M. CHAUVELIN could no longer be considered by the British Government as a public character; still, however, you admit that the Secretary of State maintained a correspondence with him. And here let me remark,

mark, that as you cite the circumstance of his not being recalled as " a pretty strong proof that " France was not then desirous of seeking a cause " for quarrel ;" it ought to have occurred to you that his being suffered to remain here might still more naturally be considered as a strong proof that the British Government were anxious to avoid all pretext for hostility : but such an admission was foreign from your purpose. You proceed to enumerate the charges preferred by this country against France, as they appear to you, from a reference to the correspondence above noticed. Among these charges you mention the proceedings of the Convention respecting the Scheldt, the decree of the 19th November, and the attack upon Holland; and you then observe, that " M. CHAUVELIN *bad* explained himself upon these subjects " in *the early part of the correspondence* ". Here you are unintelligible. Do you mean the correspondence before quoted, which took place in the months of May and July? How could that explain the decree of the 19th November, the other decree about the Scheldt of nearly the same date, and the attack upon Holland?—After that communication, (with the exception of two short letters merely desiring a conference,) no correspondence passed between Lord GRENVILLE and M. CHAUVELIN until the *twenty-seventh of December*, a date which I must entreat you to bear in your recollection, as I shall presently make it appear to

be very material. And this conference could not allude to those decrees, because it was solicited before M. CHAUVELIN knew that they had passed, on the very day indeed on which the most important of them is dated,—the 19th of November 1792.

Your affirmation, that the letters of credence sent by the prevailing faction of the day to M. CHAUVELIN, who had suddenly transferred his allegiance from the Sovereign to his assassins, were refused for no other reasons than because France was a republic, is contrary to fact. They were refused because there were at that time two *parties* in France, and no one acknowledged *nation*, and because justice as well as a regard for our own safety compelled us to espouse the part of an infant and imprisoned King, and a proscribed Nobility and Clergy¹³; whereas the reception of M. CHAUVELIN'S

¹³ In my first Letter to you, I shewed how far the opinions of the best writers on the Law of Nations justified the interference of one State in the domestic concerns of another; and I contended that such interference was, in certain cases, fully justified upon the principles of self-preservation. That your idol, Mr. Fox, had he been Minister when the Revolution happened, would not have espoused the cause of the Rebels, who had openly avowed their enmity to this country, and professed their determination to provoke us to war, but would, on the contrary, have declared himself in favour of the opposite party, we have the strongest reason to believe from his own recorded sentiments. It must be fresh in the memory of the Public, that the republican malecontents in Holland endeavoured to establish a revolution in 1787, on the ruins of the existing Government, but were prevented by a coalition of Kings, of which GEORGE the Third was one. His Majesty, in the ensuing Session of Parliament, explained, from the throne, the conduct he had pursued in order to preserve the lawful Government of Holland. Mr. Fox, in his comments on this Speech, declared,
“ For

LIN's credentials would have been tantamount to a declaration in favour of the opposite party, that is, in favour of rebels and assassins. It was natural that after such an event as the murder of the lawful monarch of France, the King of Great Britain should declare that he could no longer permit a man situated as CHAUVELIN then was, enjoying no official character, to remain in his dominions.

You state, with some degree of exultation, that previous to the dismissal of this man France was solicitous for peace, the very reverse of which I proved, in my former letter, to be the fact; and that *she had done none of the acts complained of in the correspondence until her independence had been threatened by a hostile confederacy*¹³. This last asser-

“ For myself, I do not think it necessary to inquire into the legality of the constitution of a foreign state. It is sufficient for me to consider which party is most inclined to be friendly to Great Britain.—Where there are two parties in a country, one of them hostile and another friendly to us, WE HAVE A RIGHT TO INTERFERE IN SUPPORT OF THAT WHICH IS FRIENDLY *.” And he farther stated, “ That he must contradict every political principle upon which he had hitherto acted, if he refused his approbation to the principal object of the Speech from the Throne;—those principles which have been long stigmatised as romantic constitute the system by which it is the true interest of this country to be governed †.” Here Mr. Fox spoke like a true friend to the British constitution, staunch to those old principles to which it is indebted for its vigour and prosperity. I know that since the French Revolution he has holden different language, and maintained different principles; and therefore it is that I now consider him as “ fallen from his high estate,” as the desperate leader of a desperate faction!!!

¹³ P. 41.

* See the Parliamentary Debates for 1787. † New Annual Register, p. 51.

tion is certainly true as to the *letter*, but totally false as to the *spirit*. The acts which formed the immediate subject of complaint were committed after the retreat of the DUKE OF BRUNSWICK, but others exactly of a similar nature had been committed before the existence of any confederacy whatever. Your next statement, that she had taken no steps inconsistent with her formal renunciation of conquest and aggrandisement, but "*invasions of the territory of Princes confederating or confederated against her*," is neither correct as to the letter nor as to the spirit. Numerous instances might be cited in demonstration of its inaccuracy. Among others, let me ask, what were the seizure of Avignon, the attack upon Geneva, and the invasion of the territory of the DUKE OF DEUX-PONTS, against whom the decree of the 19th of November was particularly levelled, although he had spared no pains to preserve his neutrality, even at the expence of his allegiance to the Emperor? What, too, was the attack on the *German Empire* itself, when war had been only declared against the *King of Hungary and Bohemia*?

Having finished your *mis*-statement of facts previous to the dismissal of *Citizen CHAUVELIN*, you suddenly revert back to the 12th of December when the Parliament met, and explain in your usual way, that *Parliament was an entire stranger to the conciliatory declarations*¹⁴, none of which, as I have shewn,

¹⁴ P. 42. Persevering in your *system of inaccuracy*, you observe, p. 45. that *a few days after Mr. Fox's motion for sending an Ambassador*

shewn, were delivered at the time. And upon this curious exclamation, which you enforce with all the power of *Italicks*, you found a train of argument, through which, of course, I shall not be expected to follow you.

There is one mode of argument to which the members of your party have had frequent recourse, and which produces but too great an effect on a considerable part of mankind,—I mean, the assumption of a false fact, on which you reason as if it were an established truth. Thus you declaim, I cannot say *argue*, on the happy consequences which would have resulted to Europe, “ *if, instead of inciting and encouraging the Princes of Europe to invade France*”, we had become her security “ *against their invasions, had taken a friendly yet commanding part in the establishment of her liberty, and had become the faithful but cautious protector of her first revolution!*” Here the basis of your reasoning is, that we did really incite and encourage the invasion of France; whereas it is a certain fact, though you may not possibly be acquainted with it, that so far from adopting such a line of conduct, we had actually prevented Spain from joining in the confederacy, by refusing to pledge ourselves not to push the dispute about the

Ambassador to Paris, the particulars of the correspondence above noticed was communicated to Parliament by a message from the King. Now Mr. Fox's motion was made on the 15th December, and the King's message delivered on the 28th of January,—so that instead of a *few days* an interval of more than *six weeks* elapsed between the two events.

furs of *Nootka* to an open war. Had we become the security of France against the rest of Europe, we should have become the guarantee of all her crimes, and *an accessory after the fact* to all her enormities; and had we taken *a commanding part* in her domestic concerns, we should have been guilty of that very *interference* which you so strongly reprobate, and have subjected ourselves to the very same censures which were bestowed by the second Assembly on the Emperor, who, for the mere indication of a disposition to observe the line of conduct which you have recommended, was stigmatised as a *Feuillant* ¹⁶.

Where you stumble, by chance, on a real fact, you so disfigure it by fanciful decorations of your own, as to render it scarcely cognizable. This is the case with your observation, that *the share which even BRISSOT had in the commencement of hostilities was the principal cause of his destruction, and the root of ROBERSPIERRE's popularity* ¹⁷. It is certain that BRISSOT and his associates stand convicted, by their own confession, of having provoked the war, for the purpose of abolishing the monarchy and establishing a republic on its ruins; and it is also true, that this circumstance constituted one of the charges preferred against BRISSOT on his trial. But it is absurd to suppose that it was the principal cause of his destruction and of ROBERSPIERRE's popularity, because ROBERSPIERRE followed in that respect the precise system of policy

¹⁶ See the Debates of the National Assembly. ¹⁷ P. 48.
which

which BRISSOT himself had prescribed. We have the authority of Madame ROLAND, which is certainly decisive *quoad hoc*, for asserting, that DANTON was the man who overthrew the Brissotines, by monopolising the appointment of all the Revolutionary Agents after the tenth of August 1792. As to ROBERSPIERRE, it is notorious, at this time, that the system of terror formed both the basis and support of his popularity.

I now proceed, Sir, to the examination of mis-statements of a different nature; mis-statements which cannot be imputed to a failure of recollection, but which must inevitably fix upon you the charge of infidelity. After commenting, in your own manner, on the efforts of Messrs. Fox and GREY, in the winter of 1793, to persuade the King to disgrace himself and his people by espousing the cause of the regicide faction at Paris, you observe, that "his Majesty's Ministers, on the
 " 21st of January, *with greater sincerity than has*
 " *in general characterised their proceedings, boldly*
 " *and plainly avowed the principle on which the*
 " war had been begun, and was to be prosecuted,
 " viz. *To oppose that wild and destructive system of*
 " *rapine, anarchy, impiety, and irreligion, the*
 " *effects of which, as they had been manifested in*
 " *France, furnished a dreadful but useful lesson to*
 " *the present age and posterity*"¹³. This is, indisputably, the most garbled and falsified quotation that the advocate of any party ever ventured to bring forward in the field of disputation. And

¹³ P. 69.

you have the modesty to affirm, that “ this declaration of Ministers *directly refuted their own unfounded assertion, that the war had proceeded from France*”¹⁹. I will endeavour to enable the Public to decide what credit is due to your affirmations; and if the exposure of the most gross perversion can raise a blush on the cheek of a partisan, yours shall be tinged with the dye of shame. The whole passage of the King’s Speech, of which you have professed to give a part, is as follows: “ My Lords and Gentlemen—In all your deliberations, you will undoubtedly bear in mind the true grounds and origin of the war.

“ AN ATTACK WAS MADE ON US, AND ON OUR ALLIES, *founded on principles which tend to destroy all property, to subvert the laws and religion of every civilised nation, and to introduce universally that wild and destructive system,*” &c. &c. &c.

Here the reader will perceive that, so far from any thing like a *refutation* of the just affirmation that the war had proceeded from France, the King expressly asserts that our enemies were the aggressors. What you mean by observing, that not a word is said in the Speech “ upon the footing of territory and conquest, although Mentz had been recaptured, and soon after Valenciennes, Condé, and Quesnoy taken, and although Holland had been delivered from an impending invasion,” I cannot divine. The fact is, that the Speech, at the very outset, particularly men-

¹⁹ P. 70.

tions the recovery of the Netherlands, the recapture of Mentz, and the preservation of Holland. His Majesty also (after regretting the necessary continuance of the war) says, he should ill consult the essential interests of his people, if he were desirous of peace on any grounds but such as may provide for their permanent safety, and for the *independence and security of Europe*. It must farther be remembered, that the King then proceeds to lay before Parliament a copy of his Declaration of October 1793, which contains *all the grounds of the war* fully discussed.

In your extreme anxiety to degrade the Government in the eyes of the nation, you represent the Ministers as “*asking for peace, but asking for it in vain*”²⁰;” which is a direct confession, that the continuance of the war is not to be imputed as a fault to them; a confession which totally destroys the effect of all the latter part of your pamphlet.

But you are not always so explicit. A few pages after you make the French Government, not inaptly indeed, talk quite unintelligibly: you make them ask the British Ministers, “What have we to do with the terms of a treaty *between the Emperor and England, which had our utter destruction as a nation for its foundation?*” and if, as you assert, (perhaps with reason,) that it is inadmissible for France to set up the annexation of Belgium, and the demands of her Constitution, as a bar to the proposed retrocession, it is no less inadmissible for Great Britain to set up *her own treaties with*

²⁰ P. 72.

“ *belligerent nations made without the consent of France, and made only for her destruction, as HER ultimatum for the restoration of the peace which she proposes*.” The meaning of this senseless charge I confess myself wholly unable to comprehend. What was our *ultimatum*, according to your own remark?—*the restoration of the Netherlands to their original and lawful Sovereign, the Emperor*. Was this a stipulation made “ *for the destruction of France?*” If there had been any such stipulation, (which I deny, for our Treaty with Austria was purely *defensive*, after both States had been attacked by the French,) it was expressly abandoned, instead of enforced, by such an *ultimatum* as the *status quo ante bellum*!

On the conduct of Administration after the establishment of the last new Constitution in France, you attempt to be facetious, thinking, I presume, that humour is a good substitute for fact, and wit for reason. As any attempt at compression would be an act of injustice to you, I shall quote the passage in your own language: “ *As the anarchy of France was in a manner admitted to be at an end, what was to come next? A Government capable of maintaining the relations of amity? No! This conclusion would have been too rapid a motion towards a negotiation*. We were therefore told, “ *That the distraction and anarchy which had prevailed in France had led to a crisis, of which it was as*

“ yet impossible to foresee the issue ; but which, in
 “ all human probability, must produce consequences
 “ highly important to the interests of Europe.” This
 “ bold and penetrating declaration led the way, as
 “ might be expected, to *the old necessity of prosecuting*
 “ *the war with vigour and alacrity*”.” Here you
 have again garbled the King’s Speech, quoting
 only such part of it as would suit the purpose of
 misrepresentation, and separating it from that
 which would tend to elucidate the position, and
 supply the means of confuting your argument.
 If that were not your object, why did you suppress
 the passage that immediately follows ? It is this :
 “ Should this crisis terminate in any order of
 “ things compatible with the tranquillity of other
 “ countries, and affording a reasonable expectation
 “ of security and permanence in any treaty which
 “ might be concluded, *the appearance of a dispo-*
 “ *sition to negotiate for a general peace, on just and*
 “ *suitable terms, would not fail to be met, on my*
 “ *part, with an earnest desire to give it the fullest*
 “ *and SPEEDIEST effect.*” There is *policy* at least
 in your suppression of this passage, because it nearly
 overturns all your reasoning on the subject, and
 certainly displays your censure of Ministers for not
 advising his Majesty to *connect the communication of*
this important event (the establishment of the new
 Constitution in France) *with the prospect of*
immediate peace in a most awkward point of
 view.

I have little more to say on the subject of the
 correspondence which passed between M. BAR-

THELEMY and Mr. WICKHAM at Basil, and on which, by the bye, Mr. BURKE bestowed some strong comments in his last pamphlet, which you did not dare to notice. The answer then given by the French, like that afterwards given to Lord MALMESBURY, as you observe, placed the French Constitution as a bar to the cession of any part of *the territory of the Republic, but in other respects invited negotiations*. Now it is worthy of notice, that “in the territory of the Republic” was included all which they had wrested from the Emperor, and *all their colonies and foreign settlements in both Indies then actually possessed by us*. What then, let me ask, would have remained for *negotiation in other respects*? And what could the Directory mean by receiving overtures as to other interests, political and *commercial*, which should be compatible with *the dignity of the Republic*? On this phrase Mr. BURKE laid great stress, and expatiated with considerable energy; and *therefore* you left it wholly unnoticed. Yet, notwithstanding a declaration that betrays their ambition but too plainly, you contend, that the Directory *never* meant that mutual compensations should not be the basis of the proposed peace. But the fact is, and all the proceedings of the French Government place it beyond a doubt, that their plain meaning ever was, and still is, that *peace* (if they will condescend to grant it at all) *is to be the only compensation* for all the sacrifices which they demand of us.

You labour hard to fix a charge of insincerity on our Ministers in the negotiations which they opened at Paris, through the medium of Lord

MALMES-

MALMESBURY, in the autumn of last year, and to shew, that a change took place in our Councils in consequence of the Archduke's victories, while the British Plenipotentiary was actually at Paris. With what *candour* you urge this imputation, and with what *success* your attack is attended, I shall briefly demonstrate. You say²³, "*When the embassy was first projected, we were in the lowest ebb of disgrace and misfortune: our last Ally, the Emperor, was likely to be even besieged in his capital: but whilst Lord MALMESBURY was at Paris, the unexampled spirit and gallantry of the Archduke CHARLES changed the face of things; and the season became favourable for negotiation to lie upon its ears.*" All these assertions are directly contrary to fact. The Gazette of the 6th of September contains an account of the two first important victories obtained by the ARCHDUKE over JOURDAN, in the vicinity of Amberg, and the rout of the French army; and Lord GRENVILLE's first letter to the Danish Ambassador, requesting him to apply to the French Government for a passport, is dated on that very day! On the 24th of September Lord GRENVILLE made his *second* application for a passport; and the Gazette of the *preceding day* (the 23d) contained a confirmation of the ARCHDUKE's grand victory near Wurtzburg, an account of another victory near Aschaffembourg, and of the dispersion of JOURDAN's army, pursued and attacked in all quarters, as well by the peasantry as by the Austrian troops. The same Ga-

²³ P. 100.

zette also contained an account of MOREAU having been repulsed in an attack on the Prince of FURSTENBERG, and of his consequent *preparations for a speedy retreat*. The Executive Directory did not come to a determination on the subject of Lord GRENVILLE's letter of the 24th, until the 30th of September ; nor did they communicate that determination before the 2d of the following month ; by which time they must have been apprised of the complete dissolution of JOURDAN's army, and of the imminent danger to which that of MOREAU was exposed. Lord MALMESBURY did not reach Paris till the 21st of October, when MOREAU's retreat must have been nearly effected. If, then, the military events in Germany had any influence on the conduct of either Government, it is evident that it must have been on that of France. Hence we may account for the *condescension* of these haughty Republicans in suffering our Ambassador to repair to their metropolis ; and for their subsequent chicanery on receiving the news of MOREAU's safety, and of the restoration of JOURDAN's army to at least a posture of defence. Our conduct (as far as it could be affected by the ARCHDUKE's victories) could only be intended to profit by the first favourable turn, in order to make a display of our moderation. It is somewhat singular, that a misrepresentation so flagrant of a fact so recent should have been since repeated by Mr. Fox in the course of debate ; and still more singular, that the Minister should have suffered it to pass without contradiction or notice. Thus it is, that, from the daring
effrontery

effrontery of some, and the culpable inattention of others, falsehood assumes the confidence of truth, and credit is given to perversion and imposture.

In discussing the negotiation at Paris, with the same attention to fact that is displayed in the passage above noticed, you mention the extraordinary demand of an *ultimatum*²⁴, by the Directory, in an early part of the negotiation, as being limited, in its reference, to the Austrian Netherlands, and not as a requisition of an *ultimatum upon every collateral point of negotiation*²⁵. Yet that is the only true use of the term *ultimatum*. You then seek to support your own interpretation by the following passage from Lord MALMESBURY'S note to DE LA CROIX: "*He therefore can add nothing to the assurances which he has already given to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as well by word of mouth as in his official note.*" But if you had quoted the whole of this passage, it would not have been possible for you to give to the words the sense which you have ventured to assign to them. Lord MALMESBURY observes, first, that to insist on an *ultimatum* before discussion, is to shut the door against all negotiation. He then proceeds as above, and (after a *semicolon* where you have put a *period*) continues thus: "and he *repeats*, that he is ready to enter with that Minister into every

²⁴ You confound two things which are perfectly distinct in *Diplomacy*, viz. a *sine quâ non* and an *ultimatum*. A common Lawyer might naturally have been expected to be rather more conversant with the law of nations.

²⁵ P. 102.

" explanation

“ explanation of which the state and progress of
 “ the negotiation may admit, and that he will not
 “ fail to enter into the discussion of the proposals of
 “ his Court, *or of any counter-project* which may
 “ be delivered to him on the part of the Executive
 “ Directory, with that candour and spirit of con-
 “ ciliation which correspond with the just and pa-
 “ cific sentiments of his Court.” The reply of
 the Directory to this communication was, as you
 state, “ that they would listen to no proposal con-
 “ trary to the constitution, to the laws, and to the
 “ treaties which bind the Republic;” which was
 tantamount to a positive assertion of their right to
 annul, by their private treaties, the known provi-
 sions of the law of nations, and in short to legislate
 for Europe—an arrogant and destructive pretension,
 to which if ever Great Britain should descend to af-
 ford a sanction, directly or indirectly, the sun of her
 glory will be set for ever ! In your own jargon,
 you term this answer “ an *ultimatum* against an
 “ *ultimatum on a particular point*”²⁶ ;” by which
 “ the negotiation was *brought to an inevitable*
 “ *conclusion*.” The fact was, that the Executive
 Directory had then just received intelligence of the
 sailing of the armament, under HOCHÉ, destined to
 act against Ireland. It sailed from Brest on the
sixteenth, and on the *twentieth* Lord MALMESBURY
 was dismissed. As soon as they thought themselves
 prepared for the attack, they pulled off the mask,
 and shewed themselves in their true colours.

²⁶ P. 103.

So much, Sir, for your errors, perversions, and misrepresentations, which I should not have taken the trouble to detect, if the critics had performed what I conceive to be their duty ; but this, indeed, is scarcely to be expected in an age when critics, become partisans, are less anxious to expose the defects or to point out the merits of a work, than to promote or obstruct its circulation. DRYDEN justly observes, " that *criticism*, as it was first instituted by ARISTOTLE, was meant a standard " of *judging well* ²⁷." I am sorry to say that it has now a very different meaning indeed.

Having confuted, or, at least, endeavoured to confute, every argument you have advanced on the subject of the war, it only remains to consider your opinion on the topic of peace. According to you, the balance of power, and the augmentation of our enemy's strength, are but mere secondary considerations, and all that is to be attended to by our Government, all that is of real consequence to the nation in completing the grand work of peace, is ITS SPIRIT AND TEMPER ²⁸." In support of this extraordinary doctrine you quote Mr. BURKE, who, alluding to our treaty with the

²⁷ Preface to Dryden's *Innocence*.

²⁸ P. 116. You say the cession of Belgium to the Emperor, the arrangement concerning St. Domingo, or any other specific line of negotiation, are but as dust in the balance, &c.—These trifling grammatical errors are beneath the notice of *modern critics*, though, if committed by a boy at Eton twelve years old, they would certainly incur a severe chastisement. But the Etonians are sound scholars independently of politics, and sound politicians independently of scholarship ;—would I could say as much of the critics !

American Colonies, observed, that it should be formed “ *in the spirit of peace, and laid in principles purely pacific* ;” but before you applied these words, it behoved you to shew that our relative situation with France at this period is the same as our relative situation with America was at that time, and this I defy you to do.

As to the *spirit and temper* of a peace, I conceive they can be of very little consequence unless they are *reciprocal*. That this is not likely to be the case, in the present instance, will appear from the curious review of your own pamphlet which was inserted in the *Redacteur* of the 24th April last, a paper notoriously in the pay of the French Government, and the vehicle of their sentiments. As I have no doubt that it will be highly gratifying to you to peruse the complimentary passages with which this critique is copiously interspersed,—though they are not the first compliments which you have received from *Gallic regicides*,—I shall take the trouble of transcribing it at length.

“ It is very pleasing to the friends of the Republic
 “ to see one of the first orators of England, and
 “ an ornament to the bar, defend those memorable events which are already attacked with so
 “ much violence among *ourselves* ;”—(here, Sir, we find, that you have undertaken to defend those very transactions which the most honest of the French Republicans themselves have not only deemed indefensible but worthy of reprobation !)—
 “ describe with equal force and *perspicuity*” (*risum teneatis* ?) “ the line which separates royalty from
 “ a go-

" a government that is perfectly representative ;
 " demonstrate with *enthusiasm*" (the *perspicuous*
 Mr. ERSKINE an *enthusiast* ! downright calumny !)
 " the advantages of the latter system, which does
 " not confound itself with anarchy as the friends of
 " kings assert, and as the partisans of disorder
 " desire ;—to see him finally *prove* that a counter-
 " revolution in France is impracticable ; and
 " that the return of the emigrants is impos-
 " sible ;" (there is a strange difference between
 your *proofs* and the recent *assertion* of MAS-
 SENA's troops, who positively affirm that the
 emigrants are constantly returning ; but *you* must
 be right, for you never speak *at random* ;) " and
 " that if the Directory should relinquish the
 " Austrian Netherlands, without an irresistible, an
 " absolute necessity, they will, at the same time,
 " also sacrifice the republic." (Who after this
 will *dare* to say that you plead the cause of the
 French ?)

" These propositions may, perhaps, injure Mr.
 " ERSKINE in the opinions of certain people," (Non,
 non, cela est tout à fait impossible,) " as Mons.
 " CALONNE maintains contrary propositions, and
 " as the presses at Hamburgh, under the influence
 " of the Pretender, incessantly labour to oppose
 " them."

" When Mr. ERSKINE talks on *the basis of*
 " *peace*, and on the means of consolidating it, there
 " is no *enlightened and sensible man* that does not
 " fully accede to the justice of his position. A
 " peace certainly cannot be solid, particularly

D

" between

“ between two nations which have always been
 “ rivals, except when its foundations are laid in a
 “ truly pacific disposition, and when the two
 “ cabinets eagerly strive to extinguish every par-
 “ ticle of discord. These were the principles
 “ which actuated Lord **SHELburne**” (the Mar-
 quis of **LANSDOWNE**, I apprehend, could tell a
 different story) “ and **M. DE VERGENNES** when
 “ they presided at the negotiations for the last
 “ peace. But after a war like the present, a war
 “ in which all the resentments of civil discord are
 “ combined, *can it be expected that the reconcilia-*
 “ *tion can be as complete, as sincere,* as it is after
 “ those wars in which complicated interests, al-
 “ most unknown to the great mass of the citizens,
 “ formed the subject of dispute? There is still to
 “ be seen at Boston a public building, in the front
 “ of which, the American troops that opposed the
 “ landing of the English were drawn up, and the
 “ walls of which are still stained with the blood of
 “ those citizens who were destroyed by the guns
 “ of the enemy’s ships. There is not a single
 “ American whom this sight does not inspire with
 “ a continually-increasing hatred of the British
 “ Government.” (Thanks to the manly and spi-
 rited efforts of **PETER PORCUPINE**, and to the
 base and tyrannical conduct of the Gallic Direct-
 ors, the *French* Government is, at this time, more
 an object of hatred with the Americans than the
British Government.) “ In the same manner do
 “ La Vendée and St. Domingo present their ashes,
 “ do Lyons and Toulon exhibit their ruins, and
 “ Quiberon

“ Quiberon its graves to our sight ; and so long
 “ as each of us shall think of his wounds, his
 “ afflictions, or his losses, *where is the Frenchman*
 “ *who will not feel a secret horror at bearing the*
 “ *name of his most cruel enemy pronounced ?*”

Thus we see, that although the din of arms shall have ceased, and the sword have returned to its scabbard, still the very name of an Englishman will excite horror in the mind of a Gallic republican ! Such are the *temper and spirit* with which any pacific disposition on our part will be met by our enemies ! But what else, indeed, could be expected by any man who had a competent knowledge of human nature ? The French ever have been our enemies, and, as Mr. Fox justly observed in 1787, *ever will be* ; their animosity is fixed and irradicable. So let it remain ; and let no one pretend to give to enmity the mask of friendship ; the reality can never injure us ; the delusion may. Before you can produce a change in this disposition of the French, you must mould the human mind anew. The political projects of the good Abbé de ST. PIERRE were aptly characterised by the Cardinal DUBOIS, as *The Dreams of a virtuous Man* ; and I am strongly disposed to give the same appellation to your pacific lucubrations.

One consideration, however, occurs on this topic on which you have unaccountably neglected to enlarge. You deem any sacrifice of territory that *we* can make “ as dust in the balance when
 “ compared with the spirit and temper of the
 “ peace.” But as such spirit and temper must,

as I before observed, be *mutual*, in order to produce any beneficial effect, how comes it that you have not endeavoured to impress on the minds of the *French* the necessity of making some sacrifices in order to produce them? Is the obligation, in this, as in so many other respects, to be confined to us? Are we to humble ourselves before these omnipotent republicans, and to lay the honour and the interests of our country at their feet, in order to allay their enmity and to secure their protection? Is the genius of Britain so fallen? Is the spirit of Britons so debased? Heaven forbid!

Much, indeed, depends on the spirit and temper not of the peace, but which Englishmen shall display after its conclusion. All the dangers which preceded, all the perils which accompanied the war, will be literally "as dust in the balance," when compared with the risks to which our country will be exposed on its termination. I adverted slightly to this topic in my former Letter, and I should here expatiate as largely upon it as its immense importance requires, had it not since engaged the attention of a writer who is fully aware of its consequence, and who has done it ample justice²⁹.

The means which have been employed by the Government of France for promoting a revolution in this country, during the war, will be augmented

²⁹ See "Remarks preparatory to the Issue of the renewed "Negotiations for Peace." This is the production of that truly philosophic mind to which the public is indebted for "The Origin of Duty and Right in Man considered," and of "A short Argument on the Administration of Oaths."

in a tenfold degree on the return of peace. Their present efforts have been justly described by one who knows them well,—who knows them *intus et in cute*. “ They incessantly attack,” says this able writer, “ by a multiplicity of agents, intrigues, and exertions, the fidelity of the people, and the stability of their laws ; the spirit of party has enlisted under their banners, and possibly without intending it ; one step farther, and they will find themselves in alliance with those eighty thousand Jacobins whose existence has been proclaimed by Mr. BURKE, and who are nothing more than eighty thousand servants of the Directory. Who knows even, whether plots more active, more personal, will not be directed against the King and the principal members of the Government ? Is there a crime of which the proposition, the examination, or the adoption, may not be daily found in the political ledger of the administrators of the republican revolution ³⁰ ? ”

These clandestine manœuvres will be continued with additional vigour, and with a much better prospect of success after the cessation of hostilities. It is notorious that a regular band of political missionaries are kept in pay by the Directory, and dispersed in all the great cities of Europe ; and it is their business to propagate the destructive prin-

³⁰ “ Letter to a Minister of State,” &c. by MALLET DU PAN. Translation, p. 33. Some of the minor critics, with their usual sagacity, have discovered that this spirited and sensible Letter was not written by MALLET DU PAN ;—I can only say that the original was sent to me by that gentleman’s son, as the avowed production of his father.

ciples of equality, and to sow the seeds of disaffection wherever they go. The success of their doctrines has but too fatally appeared in Italy, where the most obnoxious part of ROBERSPIERRE's political system, which no man in this country has yet been found bold enough to justify, has been rigidly enforced by a Government which professes to be actuated by principles of moderation and justice.

Wherever the French have triumphed, either by their arms or their intrigues, the immediate consequence has been the overthrow of all the existing institutions of the country. At Geneva, and Genoa; in the Venetian territory, and in the Milanese, this has been the case; even the little republic of Lucca has fallen a prey to the revolutionary rage; the independence of Sardinia and Tuscany has been invaded; the Papal power is threatened with annihilation, and Naples, as MALLETT DU PAN justly observes, has now, "thanks to French intrigues, " more moral than natural volcanoes on her territory."

Many of these States have not merely observed the most rigid neutrality during the war, but have rendered the most essential assistance to the French.

If, then, *they* who had received repeated assurances of friendship and protection, could not escape the fury of these modern Goths, what reason have *we*, against whom they have constantly, to our honour be it spoken, avowed the most inveterate enmity, to expect an exemption from the effects of their rage? Firm to the principles of the first destroyers of the monarchy, the present

present Government of France are intent on promoting the general revolution of Europe. The famous decrees passed in November and December 1792, though Mr. Fox ventured to declare in Parliament that they had been repealed, and his declaration, strange to say, was suffered to pass uncontradicted, remain in full force at the present hour, and have been acted upon in every country where the French have gained an ascendancy. The inhabitants of the Valteline *recently* justified their insurrection by declaring, "*that liberty belonged to them* BECAUSE *the natural rights of every nation had been proclaimed by the French Republic !!!*" The same Republic has also proclaimed, with equal solemnity, that the people of England ought to be "detached from their infernal Government;" and there can be no doubt that the disaffected in this country would be as ready as the inhabitants of the Valteline to avail themselves of such proclamation, in support of a rebellion, should ever an opportunity offer.

In short, nothing less, I am convinced, than the political existence of England depends on the precautions to be adopted on the conclusion of a peace with France. The Alien bill, which has been most unjustly condemned by the enemies of administration,—a bill which only gave to the British Government powers which every other Government in Europe had always exercised without control, and which the French Republic itself has exercised, in the utmost extent, from the first moment of its creation,—should be rendered per-

petual, and its provisions be enforced with the greatest vigilance and rigour. A cargo of goods from a country afflicted with the plague will be infinitely less dangerous than a cargo of Gallic reformers; Mr. FRANCIS, a Member of Opposition, and, I believe, a friend of yours, once said in the House of Commons, " My serious and deliberate conviction is, that the nearer the two nations are drawn in contact, *and the more successfully they are invited to mingle and to blend with one another,*" (or in modern style to *fraternize,*) in the same proportion the remaining morals, principles, and vigour of the national English mind will be enervated and *corrupted.*" This is a solemn truth that ought to be engraven on tables of brass in every place of public resort, and indelibly impressed on the mind of every true Englishman. Heaven forbid, that, at a moment so pregnant with danger, the genius of Britain should sleep! All persons of property who are anxious to retain the constitution that gives it security; every friend to religion and order, who wishes to preserve that system which protects the one and secures the other, should stand forth at such a crisis, and imperatively call on the Legislature to frame such regulations as the urgency of the times shall be found to require. Let the French nurse as they please the deformed offspring of their own fantastical brains, so that the *effects* of their care are confined to *themselves*; but it will be our business to protect the venerable parent of our greatness and prosperity from foreign insult and

and domestic injury ; to encircle her with an impenetrable barrier that shall render her *are perennior*, and effectually screen her from the contagious touch of Gallic philosophy, and the polluted breath of Hibernian reform. On this occasion, when the object of my solicitude is so highly important to the welfare and happiness of my countrymen, I may be allowed to exclaim, " Oh !
 " for the warning voice of the APOCALYPSE " ! "

By one who long since warned all the powers of Europe of the fatal consequences of the progress of the revolutionary spirit, we have been told that the French Government rely for the success of their schemes " on that longing after peace, proclaimed
 " even on the first day of the war, which is a
 " symptom of the failure of all courage, of all
 " reason, of all public spirit, propagated with in-
 " defatigable industry, and in the clamours of
 " which the conspirators, the factious, the revolu-
 " tionists of all countries join, forming an echo
 " to the EGOTISTS, and to those nations which
 " have not had the courage to defend themselves." You, Sir, have displayed this dangerous spirit, and contributed essentially to its propagation. I pointed out its pernicious effects at the time, and the conduct of the Directory, during the present

³¹ " We have every thing to lose. We have under our own
 " form of Government, comfort, protection, honour, security,
 " and happiness. The price of preserving them is very great,
 " but the price of anarchy, reform, and *inextricable* confusion
 " would be greater beyond all calculation." *Pursuits of Literature*, 4th Part, p. 101. note.

negotiation,

negotiation, has completely verified my predictions. But for the encouragement which they received from the frequent assertions of your party, and particularly from your own inconsiderate affirmation, that an immediate peace could alone rescue this country from destruction, would they have dared to propose the preposterous terms which they have advanced to the British Plenipotentiary at Lisle?—Can the French Government be sincere in their wishes for peace, when the conditions which they prescribe are nothing less than a restitution of all the settlements we have taken during the course of the war, not only from them, but from their allies? And on what plan is this restitution insisted on? Not as a consideration for other possessions to be returned to us,—for they have taken nothing from us,—but, forsooth, because *their* constitution and *their* treaties require such a sacrifice!—So monstrous a claim, it was reserved for the French Republic, which has made it an essential part of her system to overturn all established forms, and to introduce, in all her treaties and relations with foreign powers, new and unheard-of principles, to advance! The existence of a *Droit public* in Europe, paramount to any *Droit public* which the French may have chosen to establish in their own dominions, was properly urged by Lord MALMESBURY, during the negotiation at Paris. But it suits not their plan, it squares not with their designs, to admit the existence of any laws paramount or *equal* to their own; the power that aspires to universal empire naturally seeks to destroy

destroy all those maxims and institutions which operate as impediments to the success of its plan. Every deviation which the French extort from established rules, is with them an essential point gained, because it accustoms the inhabitants of other countries to lose that respect which they have been used to entertain for the practices of their forefathers, and to view, without dread or disgust, those dangerous innovations which may be justly considered as the elementary principles of revolution.

If the plea advanced on the present occasion were once to be admitted, what a strong temptation would such admission afford to the French for engaging in future wars ! They might then attack any independent power with a prospect of advantage, and with a certainty of sustaining no loss. Should success favour their arms, the possessions acquired by the fortune of war need only be annexed to the republic by a constitutional law, and precedent might be pleaded in support of its retention ; while the same plea might be urged, with equal force, for the recovery of any portion of her dominions which an enemy might wrest from her in the course of the contest !!!

What is the relative situation of the two countries at the period when these monstrous propositions are brought forward ? France possessed, indeed, of an immense accession of territory, but of a territory which, though it must be considered as a source of future greatness and prosperity, is so far exhausted as to afford her no present resources for continuing the war ; deprived, by her peace
with

with the continental powers, though concluded on terms the most advantageous to herself, of the means which she has hitherto enjoyed of subsisting her armies on the plunder of foreign states; her trade and manufactures destroyed, her credit annihilated, her navy crippled, her energy palsied by intestine divisions, and reduced, according to the statement of her own rulers, to such a state of distress, as to be unable to defray the ordinary expences of Government, to provide money for the troops, or even to supply food for her sick and poor³². On the other hand, Great Britain has not only preserved her own territory entire, but has wrested from France and Holland their most valuable colonies in either India, and has made Spain also feel the weight of her arms; her navy, considerably augmented by captures from each of her enemies, displays a force unequalled in the annals of naval power; her flag, triumphant in every quarter, asserts her now undisputed empire of that sea which surrounds and protects her; her squadrons block up the ports of France, Spain, and Holland, whose fleets shrink from the contest, not daring to encounter a foe whose superior prowess they have so often experienced; her supplies for the year provided; her trade, her manufactures, and her commerce flourishing; and her resources for continuing the contest still unexhausted.

Possessed of such a superiority over our enemy, we have certainly a right to insist on safe and

³² See the message of the Executive Directory to the Council of Five Hundred, at the beginning of the month of August 1797.

honourable

honourable terms of peace. What terms would be exacted by France were our respective situations reversed, we know from the conditions which she has imposed on the Emperor. It undoubtedly becomes us to consider the consequence which the acquisition of the Austrian Netherlands will produce on the commercial and political interests of this country; the wisest statesmen of past times regarded the possession of that territory by France as a fatal blow to the prosperity of England; and if the same magnanimous spirit which prevailed in former wars continued still to subsist among the people of Great Britain, the French would not have been suffered to retain it. The French republicans themselves are fully aware of its importance, but they chiefly value it for the means which it affords them of injuring the trade of England³³.

It is in vain, however, in the present state of affairs, to think of continuing the war for the purpose of detaching the Austrian Netherlands from France. But it is our duty to avail ourselves of the advantages which we possess, in order to render that accession of power by our enemy as little detrimental to the interests of England as the actual situation of things will admit. This can only be done by retaining some of the possessions which the fortune of war has thrown into our hands, thereby to afford security and extension to our foreign

³³ See on this subject, PUBLICOLA CHAUSSARD's *Historical and Political Memoirs of Belgium*, and MERLIN's Report to the Convention on the 1st of November 1794.

trade,

trade, and to open new markets for our manufactures, in lieu of those whence they will in all probability be excluded, at least partially, in consequence of the immense advantages in point of territory, extent of coast, and inland communication, which the French have acquired by their treaties with the continental powers. I will not for a moment admit the supposition, that our Government will suffer themselves to be diverted from this necessary attention to the welfare and safety of the country by the arrogant pretensions of the French; or that the people of England will be so sunk in spirit, so lost to all sense of their own dignity and interest, as to sanction, by a base acquiescence, the assertion of a right, on the part of their enemy, to give laws to Europe. What was the language holden to the Court of Vienna by the Directory of France, when negotiations for peace were opened by their respective Plenipotentiaries? It was this: "Our arms have been
 " successful in every quarter, we have stripped
 " you of a part of your dominions, and you have
 " not taken one inch of territory from us: we,
 " therefore, shall assert the right of conquest, and,
 " regardless of any treaties which you may have
 " concluded with your ally for the purpose of
 " securing the integrity of your possessions, shall
 " retain such portions of the conquered countries
 " as will indemnify us for the expences of the war,
 " and enable us to extend our commerce, and
 " secure us hereafter from the danger of invasion." On this principle the preliminary treaty,
 all

all the articles of which are not yet known, was founded.

Now we stand, in respect of conquests, precisely in the same situation relatively to France, as France then stood relatively to the Emperor. The inference is obvious. We are undoubtedly entitled, according to their own principles, putting the justice of our cause entirely out of the question, to hold the same language to her as she then held to our ally. Indeed, this was so palpable, that all the best periodical writers at Paris immediately suggested the idea, and declared that they did not see how the Directory could refuse to adopt with England the same basis of negotiation which they had themselves proposed to the Empire. In this case, then, those pretensions which a proper regard for our own security must lead us to urge, are evidently supported by a right the validity of which has been acknowledged by the French themselves.

The plea advanced by the French Government to enforce the necessity of recovering all their own Colonies—one of which, by the bye, (Tobago,) it should be remembered, was ceded by us as the *pretium pacis*, at the close of the last war,—is that they are annexed to the Republic by a constitutional law, and cannot *therefore* be given up. But, we know from one of their own members, that there is a remedy for this difficulty, for M. DE LA CROIX admitted to Lord MALMESBURY, during the negotiation at Paris, that the Austrian Netherlands, which had been annexed in the same manner,

might be detached from the Republic by a convocation of the Primary Assemblies³⁴. Now as the Directory had foreseen some months ago the probability that a cession of some of her colonial possessions would be required by England, if they had been sincerely desirous of putting a stop to the calamities of war, they had an opportunity of submitting the question to the Primary Assemblies when they were convened at the last election, "without plunging the nation," to use M. DE LA CROIX's expression, "into all the confusion which must follow a convocation" of them, for an extraordinary purpose.

As to the settlements which we have taken from the allies of France, the reason advanced to sanction the demand of their restitution is still more futile, preposterous, and absurd. To say that they must be restored because the French have guaranteed the possession of them to their former proprietors, is to say that the fiat of the Republic bears the stamp of omnipotence. If the French or their allies had any thing to restore to England, the case would be different; but they have nothing, the conquests are all on our side; the cession, therefore, must be all on theirs. Besides this obstinate determination to insist on the restitution of settlements which they had not the ability to defend, and have not the ability to retake, is a novel improvement on the past arrogance and presumption of the French Government; for no

³⁴ See P. 53. of the Official Correspondence.

longer since than the month of December last, their Minister for Foreign Affairs " was ready to confess, that, from the great losses the Dutch Republic had sustained in its colonies, and particularly from the weak manner in which they had defended them, *it could not be expected* that his Majesty would consent to a full and complete restitution of them, and that it was reasonable that some should be sacrificed".

No insurmountable obstacle, therefore, subsists to a successful termination of the present negotiation. All the obstructions that occur must be voluntarily raised by the French Directory, and must originate in a settled aversion from peace. If we consent to restore all that we have taken from France, and to sanction her retention of the Spanish part of St. Domingo, on which she will no doubt insist, *because* she obtained it in *express violation of a treaty* (the treaty of Utrecht)—the extent of her power will be almost incalculable; and we ought certainly, in that case, to retain all the settlements which we have conquered from the Dutch; because whatever is restored to them will tend to augment the strength of France, who may be considered as the proprietor of Holland; since the possession of Dutch Flanders, Maestricht, Venloo, and their dependencies, which are secured to her by treaty, and her right of keeping at all times a French garrison in the port of Flushing, will enable her to become mistress of the whole country, whenever interest or ambition may lead her to annex it, by a *constitutional decree*, to her

³³ P. 58. of the Official Correspondence.

own territory. Even this acquisition would form but an inadequate counterpoise to the gigantic power of France; unless the balance should be restored by some regulations on the Continent of Europe, which the EMPEROR of RUSSIA is the only Potentate that is now competent to enforce. And this critical juncture affords that prince a glorious opportunity of deserving the gratitude of the present age, and the thanks of posterity.

If the French colonies were to be restored without an adequate consideration, what infinite strength would the arguments of Mr. BURKE acquire, on the conduct of the war? One of the principal reasons urged in opposition to this opinion, that the troops which were sent to the West Indies would have served the cause more effectually, if they had been sent to support the Royalists in Brittany, was, that Great Britain, by directing her force against the colonial settlements of her enemy, would acquire possessions, by means of which she might, at a peace, secure the restitution of any territories that should be taken from her Continental Allies. But now that we are left without an ally, and have no restitution to demand, unless we are to reap advantage, in some other way, from our conquests, all the blood and treasure that have been consumed in acquiring them will be literally thrown away; while, had the same efforts been made in Brittany, it is more than probable,—indeed *certain*, if General DANICAN's account may be credited—that a counter-revolution would have been produced in France, the danger arising from the diffusion of democratic principles averted, and the French confined within their own limits.

But

But there cannot be a doubt that Ministers will consult the true interests and safety of the country, by insisting on a proper return for the restoration of the French colonies. They are too sensible of their importance to give them up on any other condition. During the last negotiation they considered them as an ample equivalent, in point of value, for the Netherlands, which, in order to preserve the balance of power in Europe, they very properly called upon the French to restore to the Emperor; and therefore they will not, I should hope, regard them as too dearly purchased, by the cession of the Dutch colonies. As to the Cape of Good Hope, Mr. DUNDAS expressed himself so decisively on that subject, in the debate on India affairs, towards the conclusion of the last year³⁶, that, situated as we now

³⁶ Mr. DUNDAS's expression was, "That with respect to the Cape of Good Hope, his opinion concerning the possession of that settlement was as different from that of an Honourable Baronet, (Sir FRANCIS BARING,) as light from darkness." The opinion of Sir FRANCIS BARING, from which Mr. DUNDAS here expressed his total dissent, was, that the Cape of Good Hope "was an object of no moment in the negotiation then carrying on." Of course, Mr. DUNDAS was of opinion that it was an object of very great importance to the commercial interest of this country; and as no man in the kingdom understands that interest better, or is more conversant with every thing that relates to the prosperity and security of our eastern territories, there can be no doubt that his voice will be successfully exerted in the Cabinet to procure such terms from the enemy as will be perfectly compatible with those important, those essential objects.

The opinion of Mr. DUNDAS on this subject was fully confirmed by that of a gentleman of the first consideration in the mercantile world, Mr. DAVID SCOTT, who declared, that "The Cape of Good Hope and the Island of Ceylon were of the greatest importance, next to the possession of Bengal, for securing the empire of the East." See *Woodfall's Parliamentary Reports* for 1796, vol. i. p. 522, 523.

are, its ^{de}attention must, I conceive, be deemed a settled point ; and having more than an ample equivalent to offer for the remaining colonies of that Republic, we have an indisputable right to retain them.

There is little to be said on the demand of the French Government for the restitution of the ships taken at Toulon : they certainly are not, of themselves, an object of sufficient importance to be put, for a moment, in competition with the advantages to be derived from the restoration of tranquillity. But it appears to me, that their restitution has been demanded on false grounds ; and that an unfair mode of argument has been adopted, in order to justify a compliance with the demand. It has been contended, that we had made a positive and unqualified stipulation to restore those ships, whenever peace should take place ; and in order to support this position, a *partial* quotation of Lord Hood's Preliminary Declaration to the People of Toulon, on the 23d of August 1793, has been adduced. It cannot be denied, that the latter part of that Declaration, taken by itself, is decisive of the question ; but it cannot, with any regard to propriety, be so taken : and if the whole be considered, it will, I think, be allowed, that the restitution was only intended to take place in the event of Monarchy being restored in France. In fact, who were the persons that entered into the treaty with the Combined Powers ?—the ROYALISTS : and it is notorious, that the city of Toulon was forcibly taken from them ; that the greater part of them were inhumanly massacred in cold blood ; and that,

at this moment, none of the parties to the treaty remain to call for that restitution, which, in my apprehension, they alone, according to a fair construction of the treaty, and a due consideration of all the events by which it was preceded and followed, are entitled to call for. The following is the whole of the Declaration in question :

“ *If a candid and explicit declaration in favour of Monarchy is made at Toulon and Marseilles, and the standard of Royalty hoisted, the ships in the harbour dismantled, and the port and forts provisionally at my disposition, so as to allow of egress and regress with safety, the people of Provence shall have all the assistance and support which his Britannic Majesty’s fleet under my command can give; and not an atom of private property of any individual shall be touched, but protected; having no other view than that of restoring peace to a great nation upon just, liberal, and honourable terms:—this must be the ground-work of the Treaty.*

“ And whenever peace takes place, which I hope and trust will be soon, the port, with all the ships in the harbour, and forts of Toulon, shall be restored to France, with the stores of every kind, agreeable to the schedule that may be delivered.”

The ground-work of this Treaty then, as far as I can understand it, was the restoration of Monarchy in France. Had that event taken place, no question would have arisen upon the subject; but the city voluntarily surrendered having been forcibly recovered, and an attempt made to retake those very

ships in the harbour, from that moment the Treaty (until the restoration of Monarchy at least) ceased to have effect, and the vessels became lawful prizes.

There is one melancholy reflection that must naturally arise in the mind of every man who has the welfare and interest of his country at heart, on contemplating the present state of political parties. If Ministers were now to conclude a Treaty with France, upon terms that confirmed the extension of her power, and gave a sanction to her principles; upon terms the most derogatory to the honour, and the most incompatible with the prosperity and safety of the kingdom, the Members and Supporters of Opposition would not dare to arraign them for their conduct. That "the salvation of the country depends upon immediate peace," is the language which they have uniformly holden. No sacrifice, therefore, which Ministers should make to obtain it could possibly incur *their* censure. Thus, by their eagerness to thwart the operations of Government, have they deprived themselves of all opportunity of becoming the champions of their country, the defenders of her interest, or the guardians of her honour, at a period so critical and important, that nothing less than her political existence depends on the wisdom of her councils, and the energy of her decisions. Such are the dreadful effects of a spirit of party, founded on a violation of all sound principles, and pursued in open contempt of all that Englishmen have hitherto been accustomed to regard as true patriotism. *One Peer*, indeed, has *specially* reserved to himself the right of

of displaying the true spirit of a Briton on such an occasion; and there are, no doubt, some few Members of either House, who would stand forward in support of his arguments. But there would be no regular force, no united body, no party, in short, to rise in defence of the forsaken country. The Press too, so far as relates to periodical publications, which have the most general influence on the public mind, would be equally passive, if not worse than passive; for, strange as it may appear, it is indisputably true, that it is as much shackled and restrained by the spirit of party as it could be by the most restrictive laws! Fortunately we are warranted, from the past declarations and conduct, as well as by the known disposition and characters of the British Ministers, to believe that the country will never be placed in so perilous a situation.

At all events, it becomes the Nation to manifest that spirit which shall convince our enemy that we are resolved to encounter every difficulty which can result from a continuation of the war, rather than purchase peace by a base dereliction of those principles which our ancestors ever held sacred. A writer, whom I have had frequent occasion to quote, and whose predictions, unfortunately for Europe, have hitherto been too fatally verified, thus describes the disposition and intentions of France towards this country: "The Emperor, reduced by force to the necessity of abandoning his only Ally, the Directory will turn all their thunder against England. On that Constitution which acts as an incessant satire on the democratic

“ extravagances of the French Conventions—on
 “ the King of a *free* Nation—on a State more
 “ rich, more industrious, more flourishing, than
 “ modern France—on that receptacle of so many
 “ treasures—on that power whose weight still seems
 “ to balast the Continent—they have resolved to
 “ inflict a fatal blow. It is absurd to suppose, that
 “ the desire of recovering a few colonies will ever
 “ inspire the French Government with an idea of
 “ peace. They have devoted the Antilles to de-
 “ solation—they have covered them with a crowd
 “ of desperate banditti—they are less anxious to
 “ regain what they have lost, than to reduce the
 “ whole of that Archipelago to ashes ³⁷.” Again—
 “ The Republic wishes to remain at war with
 “ Great Britain, isolated, and abandoned by the
 “ Continent ³⁸.” Should this really prove to be
 the case, the war will then indeed become what the
 French Republicans, at the commencement of the
 contest, so frequently stated it to be, *Bellum inter-*
necinum. The only mode of convincing our ene-
 mies of the folly of such conduct, is by shewing
 them that we have sufficient unanimity among our-
 selves, and sufficient resources to render all their
 senseless projects abortive. As the commercial
 world would be peculiarly affected by a disadvan-
 tageous peace, it behoves them to set an example
 of public spirit, and to make an offer, in which
 they would doubtless be joined by all the opulent
 part of the community, to furnish the requisite
 supplies for another campaign, in a way that would

³⁷ Letter to a Minister of State, p. 30.

³⁸ Id. p. 31.

effectually prevent any depression of the funds, in case the French should not accede to fair and equitable terms. Such an offer, made at this critical period, would have the most beneficial effect on public affairs. It would revive the drooping spirit of the nation, strike the enemy with dismay, and accelerate the conclusion of a Treaty on safe and honourable grounds.

Supplies indeed might still be raised in the usual way, but only on terms highly disadvantageous to the public; and recourse cannot then be had to an open loan, *similar to the last*, after what has passed on that subject in the House of Commons. As much misrepresentation has taken place on the subject of that loan, and as the public in general are but little acquainted with the true grounds of the application made to Parliament, during the last Sessions, for some relief to the subscribers, and as it is essential, as well from justice to the individuals concerned in the transaction, as from national considerations of great importance, that the matter should be rightly understood, I shall briefly state the whole business in its true colours.

When the Chancellor of the Exchequer found it expedient to adopt the mode of raising the supplies for the year by means of a voluntary loan, instead of having recourse to the usual mode, he sent for a number of Bankers and other mercantile men, who were in the habit of advancing money on such occasions, to whom he communicated his intention of raising the sum of FIFTEEN MILLIONS, *which would be all that he should want to raise by loan until after the 31st of October 1797, the day on which*

which it was proposed that the last payment upon the intended voluntary loan should be made. After that time, it was probable that he might have occasion to issue Exchequer Bills to the amount of Four or Five Millions. He farther stated, that the proof of public spirit which a loan advanced in the way which he had suggested would supply, would certainly be productive of great advantage to the State. After this interview the Chancellor of the Exchequer, having revolved the matter in his own mind, determined to extend the sum to EIGHTEEN MILLIONS, which he conceived would be adequate to defray ALL the expences of the year.

It may be asked, in *what* the proof of PUBLIC SPIRIT consisted in this transaction? The answer is obvious. The subscribers consented to advance their money to Government on terms highly advantageous to the State, and highly disadvantageous to themselves. They were to pay 100 *l.* in money for 112 *l.* 10 *s.* stock, which stock, at the price which it then bore, would only produce 97 *l.* 10 *s.*; so that they submitted to an immediate and certain loss of $2\frac{1}{2}$ *per cent.* which, on the Eighteen Millions, amounted to 450,000 *l.* To this loss, at a time too when money might be employed most beneficially to the possessor, and to any other loss which a difference of stock, produced by the common course of events, might occasion, the subscribers voluntarily subjected themselves; and in so doing they unquestionably displayed a signal proof of public spirit. But they did not subject themselves to any farther loss; for they advanced their money in consequence of, and in a firm reliance upon,
Mr.

Mr. PITT's declaration, that *he should not have occasion to raise any more money, by way of loan, for the service of the year.* If they had been told that, after a short interval, another loan would be necessary, they certainly, at least a greater part of them, would not have advanced their money on the terms proposed, because they would have known that they must naturally sustain a much greater loss than that which they had made up their minds to sustain.

Contrary to Mr. PITT's expectations, the pressure of public affairs, in a very short space of time, rendered another loan, and to a very large amount, unavoidable. It was accordingly raised, and on terms which sufficiently proved how much indebted the nation was to the liberality of the subscribers to the voluntary loan. The consequence of this transaction is well known; the market became overstocked with scrip; the first loan immediately experienced a considerable depreciation; and the loss of the subscribers was now increased from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 15 per cent. or from 450,000 *l.* to 2,700,000 *l.*! And this enormous additional loss was occasioned solely and exclusively by the circumstance of Mr. PITT being reduced to the necessity of acting contrary to that declaration, upon the faith of which the subscribers had advanced their money. The difference in value between the two loans has been as much as *twenty-six per cent.*; which difference is, of itself, sufficient to shew what essential obligations the nation are under to the persons who subscribed to the first loan.

Under these circumstances it must, I think, appear to every impartial and upright mind, that the
application

application to Parliament for relief from a loss produced in such a way, must be considered not as a claim for *indulgence*, but as a demand for *justice*; and nothing can be so clear as that to stigmatise men who advanced their money on the terms which I have described, as mercenary jobbers and interested speculators, is to advance a calumny as foul and as gross as ever fell from the lips of a detracter. It may very well suit the purpose of Mr. SHERIDAN to render every thing connected with *Loyalty* the butt of ridicule, or the subject of reprobation; but the subscribers to the loan cannot be much affected either by the wit or the abuse of a man who has stood forward as the assailant of Mr. REEVES, and the encomiast of Messrs. MUIR and PALMER. To select the Father of the Loyal Associations, the end of which was to defend the Constitution against the attacks of its enemies, foreign and domestic, as the object of prosecution, and felons who had been convicted of seditious practices, the tendency of which was to destroy the Constitution, as the objects of panegyric, betrayed a mind so framed, that its censure must confer distinction, and its praise alone be regarded as a theme for regret! They are minds of this stamp that have uniformly, during the war, gloried in the success of the French, and triumphed in the defeat of their enemies.

Νῦν δὲ τί τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακὰ γίγνεται ἐτθλα κακοῖσιν
 Ἀνδρῶν, γίγνεται δ' εὐτραπέλοισι νόμος.

It is worthy of remark, too, that the application in question was founded upon no novel principle,
 but

but was fully authorised by a very recent example. It must be fresh in the recollection of every member, that Mr. BOYD, at the close of the year 1795, claimed an indemnity for a loss which he was likely to sustain on account of a second loan being necessary before the payments on the preceding loan, which had been filled by himself and his friends, would be completed. The justice of this plea was admitted by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and confirmed, after much deliberation, by the House, although it appeared, in the course of debate, "*that the greater part of the first loan had been sold for a high premium:*" The indemnity which Mr. BOYD claimed and received was a preference in respect of the new loan, which he accordingly advanced, on terms which were deemed advantageous to the public. Those terms were, for every 100 *l.*, 104 *l.* 5 *s.* 3 *d.*; so that the subscribers to the voluntary loan advanced their money to the public at the rate of 6 *l.* 15 *s.* 3 *d.* *per cent.* less than Mr. BOYD, whose terms were allowed to be advantageous to the nation; and this made a difference, upon the Eighteen Millions, in favour of the public, of 1,217,500 *l.*!—And if the greater scarcity of money at the period when the last of these loans was advanced be taken into consideration, the difference will be found to be infinitely greater. Hence it is evident that the subscribers to the voluntary loan have a much greater claim upon Parliament than Mr. BOYD had, whose claim was admitted: *indulgence* they wish not, but *justice* they are entitled to expect; and it becomes the House most seriously to consider

sider the consequences that may result, not only from a refusal, but even from a hesitation, to comply with a demand of this nature. To give a check to public spirit is at all times impolitic, but, at a period like the present, to disgust the best friends of the country, is to commit an act of suicide!

One argument was produced in the debate on this business which ought not to pass without notice: it was contended by Mr. SHERIDAN, who was not likely to be affected by the decision, and by some other gentlemen in Opposition, that a member who was personally interested in the transaction, by being a subscriber to the loan, had no right to give a vote on the question. Of the justice of this principle, as applicable to every other body of men than the *Representatives of the People*, every one must be convinced; but how far the House of Commons is authorised to deprive the people of the advice and assistance of any one of their *Representatives*, on a matter of public concern, is a question not so easy of decision. Without, however, entering upon a discussion which could not, for obvious reasons, be pursued without danger, let me ask whether this principle, which, in the present instance, was evidently advanced to serve the purposes of party, be generally observed by the House of Commons? I believe no one Member will feel disposed to answer in the affirmative. If my memory fail me not, instances may be adduced in which Mr. SHERIDAN himself has acted in open violation of it. I think it was towards the close of Lord NORTH's administration, that

that a tax was suggested on places of public amusement, when the *Member for Stafford* declared his resolution to oppose it, *because* it would be injurious to his interest, as a *proprietor of Drury-Lane Theatre*³⁹. Another Member of Opposition, being recently applied to on the subject of a canal bill about to be brought into the House, which it was stated would be productive of great injury to a nobleman in the neighbourhood, observed, that his personal interest was so deeply involved in the success of the bill, that he should certainly give it all the support in his power. Indeed, it is notorious, that in the case of turnpike and canal bills, which, be it observed, are to all intents and purposes *public bills*, the Members who are most interested not only bring them into the House, but watch their progress with the most active solicitude, vote upon every question to which they give rise, preside at the committees⁴⁰, act the part of advocates, and even make as regular a canvas

³⁹ My recollection of this transaction is very imperfect, and I should be truly sorry to commit any error in my statement. But, I believe, that Mr. SHERIDAN observed, that the proposed tax, which was to have been sixpence on every Box-ticket, would prevent a number of persons from frequenting the Theatre. Whether he has found this to be the case since he has, by his own authority, imposed a tax of one shilling on the admission to the boxes, I cannot pretend to say.

⁴⁰ It were to be wished that Committees of this description were subject to the same regulations as the Committees for trying contested elections; for cases not unfrequently occur in which public good is opposed, and, I am sorry to say, unsuccessfully opposed, to private interest. In the case of a canal bill, it is rather extraordinary that a man who holds a single share in the canal is thereby incapacitated from being heard as a witness, while a Member who holds a hundred shares is allowed to sit as a Judge.

for supporters as for votes at a general election. I do not mean to justify this conduct, but merely to contend, that it ill becomes the men who violate the principle in one instance, to enforce it in another; and, that if the principle be just in itself, and be *ever* applied, it ought *always* to be applied.

As this, Sir, is probably, the last time that I shall have occasion to address you, I think it necessary to repel a charge which has been preferred against me, on the subject of my former letter. I have been publicly accused of treating you not only with acrimony and violence, but even with *malignity*, which implies a disposition of mind to which, thank Heaven! I am a total stranger. If I did not clearly establish the difference between your private and professional, and your political character, I certainly expressed my sentiments but very imperfectly. While I condemn the errors of the politician, I admire the talents of the advocate, I respect the virtues of the man. It is, indeed, the respect which I entertain for your personal virtues that increases my solicitude to expose your political errors. For I am truly concerned to see a man of respectable character become the advocate of a desperate faction. All the evils which have desolated France, and which threaten to spread their baleful influence over Europe, are imputable to a similar conduct pursued by men of the same stamp, at the commencement of the revolution. It was the *moderate* party, it was that description of persons who were friends to a rational reform, and who, from the *urbanity, candour, and moderation,*

moderation, which they displayed in their arguments, not less than from the excellence of their private characters, and the real or supposed goodness of their intentions, gained a considerable ascendancy over the half-reformed and well-meaning part of the community, that paved the way for the destruction of the ancient monarchy of France. By imperceptible degrees, they poisoned the minds of the people, taught them to shake off that respect, bordering on veneration, with which they had been used to regard the institutions of their ancestors, accustomed them to view the progress of innovation with a fearless eye, served, without intending it, the cause of the Jacobins, and, in seeking to awaken the embers of reform, fanned the flame of revolt. Had the Jacobins themselves stood forward, in the first instance, and displayed all their hideous deformity, all their ferocious violence, to the naked sight of the public, before their minds had been thus prepared for the reception of their doctrine, the people would have been stricken with horror at their attempts, and all their efforts to demolish a fabric which had withstood the shocks of fourteen centuries, would have proved fruitless and abortive. Should the enemies of England ever succeed in subverting the constitution of the country,—*Dii talem avertite pestem!*—they must be indebted for their success to the previous exertions of virtuous but mistaken men, who, aiming at improvement, facilitate demolition.

If, in the exposure of your errors, I have used strong language, I can support my conduct by

F

authorities

authorities which those who censure it most will be least disposed to reject. A noble author, to whose opinions I am not accustomed to pay much respect, but who began this controversy, at the conclusion of his Letters to his constituents, expressly says, "If my language has been strong, it appears to me to suit the nature of the times." Mr. Fox himself has made a similar declaration in the course of debate; and whoever will read with attention the speeches of Mr. SHERIDAN, since the commencement of the war, will be compelled to acknowledge that no language which I have used is to be compared, in point of violence, with his. Indeed, I can scarcely conceive it possible not to express strongly that which is strongly felt; but, on recurring to my Letter, I apprehend, you will find that the strongest passages which it contains are extracted from the speeches of Mr. Fox and yourself.

Some parts of that production which have, I know, given considerable offence, though prudence forbids the confession, I am enabled to justify by your own principles. In a recent address, conveyed in language the most nervous and impressive, enforced with reasons the most cogent and convincing, marked by sentiments the most honourable to the heart that conceived them, and breathing a spirit of christianity the most pure and upright, you proclaimed the influence of religion and morality on the government of a state. You justly remarked, that "public freedom is best secured
" by the morals of a nation;" and most truly
asserted,

asserted, that " the religious and moral sense of the
 " people of Great Britain is the great anchor which
 " alone can hold the vessel of the state amidst
 " the storms which agitate the world." Acceding,
 as I do, most cordially, to the soundness of this
 doctrine, am I to be censured for deprecating the
 appointment of men, who live in open violation of
 all the ties of religion and morality, to places of
 high trust in the state* ? If not only the preserva-
 tion of public freedom, but the political salvation
 of the state depends on the religious and moral sense
 of the people, is not he the best friend of his
 country who seeks to exclude from her govern-
 ment the irreligious and the immoral, however
 fascinating their eloquence, however splendid their
 talents ?

" Velocius et citius nos

" Corrumpunt vitiorum exempla domestica, magnis

" Cum subeunt animis auctoribus."

On this point, Sir, if you remain true to your
 own principles, and I am convinced that you are
 incapable of departing from them, we must agree ;
 admit my premises, and you cannot impeach the
 justice of my conclusions. However widely we
 may differ on political topics, on all questions of

* On this point I have the further support of an authority
 to which many of your political associates will incline to pay
 greater respect than yourself.—" GOOD MEN, NOT GOOD
 " LAWES, MUST SAVE KINGDOMES."—" PUT RIGHTEOUS
 " MEN INTO PLACES OF TRUST."—This was the language
 of no less a man than HUGH PETERS ; as you may see by
 referring to a tract of his intitled, "*A Word for the Armie, and*
 "*two Words for the Kingdome.*" Printed in 1647.

morality our sentiments, I trust, will ever be found to correspond.

Now that I am on the subject of exculpation, I shall take leave to advert to one other accusation which has been alleged against me, with an equal regard to truth, and urged with an equal degree of candour. It has been insinuated, in terms too plain to be mistaken, that I am an *agent* of administration, and have been *employed* by Government to write in defence of their measures. This idea has been propagated with a view to discredit my writings, and to impeach the sincerity of my principles. I should be fully justified, indeed, in treating such a charge with silent contempt. Admitting it to be true, it could not possibly affect the strength of my arguments or the validity of my proofs. The attention of critics should be limited to the contents of a book; whenever they go beyond that point, they travel out of the record, they transgress the bounds of their duty, and subject themselves to censure for impertinence. But as the charge is intended to impress the preposterous idea, that no man can support the government of the country on *principle*; as in the present times the influence of prejudice is peculiarly strong; and as the most incessant efforts are made to increase it, by *certain sectaries who have nine-tenths of the periodical publications of the day in their hands or under their control*; I deem it expedient to repel it, by a solemn and unequivocal declaration, that no one person connected with ministers has had the smallest concern with any political pamphlet that I ever have composed; that I have written them all spontaneously

spontaneously without any communication with others; that no part of the expence attending the publication of them has been borne by Government; that I never have received, directly or indirectly, any consideration or recompence for having published them, except a fair division of the profits arising from their sale; that I was not led to compose them from the hope of emolument or the prospect of reward, but solely and exclusively from a conscientious and disinterested desire to serve the cause, which I had espoused from *principle*, and from a conviction of its tendency to promote the welfare and happiness of my country. That there are minds which can only be stimulated to exertion by the spur of interest, I can easily conceive; and it is perfectly natural that such minds should judge of others by themselves.

Extraordinary, Sir, as it may appear to you, it is with extreme repugnance that I have been induced to say so much of so insignificant an individual as myself; but my duty to the public seemed to me to require it. Though it seems that I have subjected myself to the imputation of *egotism*, from the adoption, I suppose, of the epistolary style, which renders a frequent use of the first person unavoidable, it is, in fact, a fault or a foible, whichever it may be called, that I utterly despise. I shall now, Sir, take my leave of you with the expression of an earnest hope, that cool reflection will lead to a retraction of your errors, and that you will suffer the virtues of the moralist to correct the vices of the politician.

A WORD TO THE CRITICS.

I WILL not address *you* in the style in which a facetious bard once addressed a convocation of serious and learned men in one of our Universities,—I will not, like him, say—“ Vos Doctores sine doctrinâ, vos Magistri artium sine artibus, vos Bachelorii baculo potius quam lauro digni.”—I will rather adopt the style of the courteous Moor, as being better adapted to the high office which you hold in the court of literature:—“ Most potent, grave, and reverend Signiors,”

It has, of late, become a practice with the book-sellers, whenever they wish to promote the circulation of a work, to extract from your critical labours, such passages as, in their apprehension, contain sentiments favourable to the author, and either to subjoin them to the advertisement which announces the publication to the world, or to prefix them to the book itself. To me, I confess, it appears that this custom, however it may be found to answer the purpose of the bookseller, is very unfair in respect of the public, as it exhibits to their view nothing more than an *ex-parte* evidence, by which *their* decision ought certainly never to be regulated. In order to obviate any objection that might reasonably be
started

started to this unfair mode of proceeding, and to enable my readers to profit by the admirable talents, the nice discriminative powers, the vast political knowledge, and the wonderful critical acumen which you have displayed in your masterly analysis of my unfortunate work, I shall totally sink the praises which one of your brethren has rashly bestowed on it, and present them only with such of your comments as tend to consign it to everlasting infamy. Seniores Priores—I shall begin with

The MONTHLY REVIEW (for July 1797).

“ ‘Affectation and hypocrisy,’ says Mr. G. (p. 170) ‘which the refinement of modern philosophy has dignified with the equivocal appellation of *liberality* and *moderation*, are not the weapons of TRUTH.’ Under the influence of this principle, in its utmost latitude, the present publication appears to have been written. It is VIOLENT⁴⁰, scurrilous, and abusive; yet WITHOUT FORCE, satire, or humour. It concludes with this paragraph: ‘A firm determination to suffer no imposition to be practised upon the public, in a point of such extreme importance to the nation, and a wish to display the conduct of your party in a proper point of view, led me to submit, in a state of health but ill-calculated for mental exertion of any kind, to the trouble of perusing your tract and

⁴⁰ “Violence, *force*; violent, *forcible*, acting with strength.” Johnson.—To be *forcible without force* is a talent which I was not conscious of possessing; thank ye, sapient Critics, for the discovery!

“ exposing its defects. *To use your own language,*
 “ —These considerations induced me to travel
 “ through one of the most dull, despicable, and
 “ miserable performances that ever I had been
 “ doomed to read.”

And this is called criticism!!! God help the poor nation whose literary taste is to be directed by such critics as these. I was once so unfortunate as to incur the commendation of these gentlemen, and, strange as it may appear, for a political tract written on the very same subject as that which is here so unmercifully treated, containing arguments founded on the very same data, enforcing the very same principles, and having the very same object and end!—But,

Quid refert dictis ignoscat Mucius, an non?

I cannot be very anxious to court the praise, or to avert the censure of men, who can class the author of the book “on Political Justice” and of “The Enquirer,” whose object appears to be to reverse the admonition of Saint PAUL, and to render every man discontented with his lot, among “the *benevolent philosophers and enlightened reformers*” of the age; and who can represent our public seminaries of education “as *initiatory schools of vice* *.”

Next in order comes that mirror of political and critical wisdom, manufactured by——but,
 hush,

* See *Monthly Review* for July 1797, —pp. 293, 294.— One mode by which these Potent Signiors frequently shew their approbation or dislike of a publication is by accelerating or retarding their review of it. Thus Mr. ERSKINE's Pamphlet appeared

hush, I will not disclose “ the secrets of the Prison-
“ house,”—ycleped

The CRITICAL REVIEW (for July 1797).

‘ After the ample discussion which the origin
‘ of the war had undergone—after the unconfuted
‘ arguments, and the strong and unanswerable
‘ *proofs* which had been adduced by a learned and
‘ worthy friend of mine, as well as by myself, in
‘ support of its justice and necessity, I conceived
‘ the question of aggression to be finally decided.’
—P. 1.

“ This worthy friend, JOHN BOWLES Esq. and
“ our Author, are a very pretty pair—*par nobile*
“ *fratrum*, equally capable of deciding great po-
“ litical questions. Our Author holds his anta-
“ gonist in the utmost contempt.”

‘ Your whole narrative’ (says he) ‘ of the
‘ proceedings previous to the declaration of war
‘ by France, exhibits a gross ignorance of facts,
‘ a shameful perversion of circumstances, and a
‘ mishapen heap of false conclusions, which mark
‘ the advocate of party, but disgrace the friend of
‘ truth.’—P. 51.

——‘ the observations which are scattered over
‘ your Work, like the thistles on your native hills,

appeared in the middle of March ; and, ON THE FIRST OF
APRIL, with ominous precipitation, the Monthly Reviewers
proclaimed him to be equal, in political wisdom, to the *Sages*
of Greece and Rome ! Whereas my unfortunate Answer, which
appeared in the following month, was not consigned to infamy
till the first of August !

‘ that

‘ that exhibit a spectacle of disgusting barrenness,
 ‘ deforming the soil they are unable to fertilize.’—
 P. 51.

‘ The contempt which the extreme puerility
 ‘ of your arguments extorts is lost in surprise at
 ‘ the weakness of their basis. But the foundation
 ‘ being destroyed, the superstructure falls of course,
 ‘ exhibiting, in its flimsy ruins, an object for the
 ‘ derision of sense, the scorn of judgment, the
 ‘ deploration of vanity, and the lamentations of
 ‘ egotism.’—P. 55.

“ Mr. ERSKINE will derive some small consolation
 “ under these censures, *that* * John Locke, printed
 “ in *Italics*, is termed ‘ that arch propagator of wild
 “ conceits, that wholesale fabricator of fanciful
 “ systems of polity.’ After such specimens of
 “ our Author’s style†, our readers will, we are per-
 “ suaded, very gladly be *excused from* any further
 “ extracts *out of* this monstrous heap of egotism,
 “ self-conceit, and misrepresentation. We will not,
 “ however, apply to this Work what our Author
 “ does to that of his adversary, that it is ‘ one of
 “ the most dull, despicable, and miserable per-
 “ formances that ever we had been doomed to
 “ read;’ we will do him the justice to say, that we

* Your sublime Critics cannot be expected to lower their understandings to a level with the vulgar rules of *grammar*!

† So that *style*, according to these Critics, is the only thing to be considered in a political tract. Yet to judge by the construction of the sentences in this curious Critique, in which not only style but grammar appears to be holden in utter contempt, one might be led to imagine, that it would be the only thing they would neglect to notice!

“ have even read worse—worse not only in style
 “ and composition, but even in spirit and intention.”

I am very much obliged to the gentlemen, and am truly happy in my ability to return the compliment to their *Critique*; for I have perused their remarks on former productions of mine, as well as on others which they have been pleased to father on me. Indeed they have displayed a much greater degree of moderation and candour in this instance, than I had a right to expect after their past animadversions, and after the appearance of the *note* in p. 136 of my Letter to the Earl of LAUDERDALE, which it is possible I may one day be tempted to enlarge.—*Verbum sat*.

“ Though last, not least in fame,” comes

The ANALYTICAL REVIEW (for May 1797).

“ More than fifty pages of this pamphlet are
 “ filled in an endeavour to shew the falsehood of
 “ Mr. ERSKINE’s reasoning on the question, Who
 “ were the aggressors in the present war, the French
 “ or the English? Mr. ERSKINE attempted to
 “ prove the French were *not* the aggressors. Mr.
 “ G. with much bitterness of sarcasm, and malignity of reproach, urges the ministerial *declamation*, and quotes from many party writers, to
 “ prove, that England has only acted on the defensive, and that France actually and resolutely
 “ planned, provoked, and began the contest*.

* The quotations by which I proved this fact, were not taken from *Party-Writers*, but chiefly from the written and verbal declarations of the French Republicans themselves.

“ In

“ In addition to the reasons *we* have alleged
 “ against the supposition of French aggression*, we
 “ have to observe that, whoever began the war,
 “ *it is clear* that we often rejected overtures for
 “ peace†, not even for the *ostensible* reason
 “ (it was never suggested at the time even by
 “ Ministers) that the French were not *sincere* in
 “ their *propositions of negotiation*, but because they
 “ were scornfully represented as incapable of main-
 “ taining the accustomed relations of peace and
 “ amity. Nay, so far were the nation from being
 “ induced to countenance the war at first on ac-
 “ count of any apprehension of French invasion,
 “ or the immediate attacks of the French either by
 “ sea or land, that the plea of our rulers, and the
 “ fears of the people, went to the possibility, *if*
 “ *they were suffered to establish a free government*,
 “ that they would, at some future time, assist in
 “ destroying the monarchies of Europe. Upon
 “ *every offer of negotiation*, upon every motion on
 “ the subject in the House of Commons, was it
 “ not triumphantly asked, With whom are we to
 “ treat? We were of opinion, that Mr. ERSKINE
 “ fully proved his point, as far as the matter of
 “ aggression came under review, and we continue
 “ still of the same opinion; nor can the represent-
 “ ations of Mr. ERSKINE, and the clear recollec-
 “ tion of our own minds, receive any refutation

* “ See review of Mr. ERSKINE’s Pamphlet, *Analytical*
 “ *Review* for March, p. 308.”

† I should be glad to know *when*, *by whom*, and *to whom*
 these overtures for peace were made?

“ from

“ from *the garbled accounts*, the dogmatical *as-*
 “ *sertions*, and the *ex-parte statements* of Mr. G.
 “ Whatever the Combined Powers *publicly* declared
 “ is sufficient evidence of their intention, to this
 “ *independent* writer ; but whatever was pro-
 “ nounced, and with whatever solemnity accom-
 “ panied*, by the French, is rejected at once as
 “ false, deceitful, and perfidious. The various ob-
 “ jects of the war, at different times alleged by
 “ Mr. PITT, and his various and opposite mani-
 “ festoes, shew, that Mr. G., when the conduct of
 “ Ministers is the object, possesses the faith “ *that*
 “ *removes mountains.*” It is fit, however, that
 “ our readers should have some specimens of his
 “ eloquence, his reasonings, and his modesty.”

P. 55.—‘ In the same perverse spirit and with equal truth you ascribe the
 ‘ emigration of the Royalists, and the seizure of their estates, to the same
 ‘ cause ; and boldly assert, that, but for the war, the Emigrants “ would have
 ‘ remained within the bottom of France :” whereas it is notorious, that one
 ‘ of the specific grounds of complaint alleged by the Brissotin faction against
 ‘ the Emperor, was the assemblage of large bodies of Emigrants in his domi-
 ‘ nions ; and that the decree for the confiscation of their property was passed
 ‘ by the Legislative Assembly *before* the declaration of war. The contempt
 ‘ which the extreme puerility of your arguments extorts is lost in surprise at
 ‘ the weakness of their basis. But the foundation being destroyed, the su-
 ‘ perstructure falls of course, exhibiting, in its flimsy ruins, an object for the
 ‘ derision of sense, the scorn of judgment, the deploration of vanity, and the
 ‘ lamentations of egotism.

‘ Your general ideas on the causes of revolutions in a State, and the basis
 ‘ of civil government, appear to me to be as crude and undigested as your par-
 ‘ ticular application of them is false and unwarranted. Your grand principle,
 ‘ as far as I can understand it, is—that all lawful “ government is a voluntary
 ‘ emanation from the whole people ;” a principle which has been before ad-
 ‘ vanced by that arch propagator of wild conceits, that wholesale fabricator of
 ‘ fantastical systems of polity (accuse me not of political blasphemy !) *John*

* To those who have read the book it is needless for me to observe, that there is not one syllable of truth in this account of it.

‘ *Locke,*

* Locke, who had scarcely given birth to this shapeless abortion, when he
 * crushed it at a stroke, by proving the *impossibility* of its existence. He was
 * compelled to acknowledge, that “ *the coming into society upon such terms*
 * “ would be—only to go out again.”

“ On the observations of Mr. ERSKINE, respect-
 “ ing the never to be forgotten expedition to Qui-
 “ beron, *you* have the following reflections, in our
 “ Author’s very best manner.”---P. 65.

* But, say you, “ What was this proceeding but the very system we had
 “ imputed to France, and proclaimed with horror to the universe ?” The
 “ jaundiced eye of party could alone descry any resemblance in transactions so
 “ different in their nature. The French had holden out an invitation to rebel
 “ to all the nations of Europe, indiscriminate’y, whether at peace or war with
 “ them, and had, to give effect to the measure, by an order of their Legislature,
 “ caused such invitations to be translated into all foreign languages. By the
 “ voluntary offer of her protection to insurgents, France thus endeavoured to
 “ produce insurrections where harmony prevailed, and to disorganise the exist-
 “ ing institutions of Europe, for the purpose of establishing a general system of
 “ her own. Our Ministers, on the contrary, in exercising the legal rights of
 “ war against a Power which had been guilty of an unprovoked aggression, and
 “ which had forcibly compelled us to engage in the contest, confined their
 “ operations to affording assistance to a body of men, who fought in defence
 “ of a long established system which they had solemnly sworn to maintain,
 “ against a government founded in perjury, violence, and murder ; which had
 “ robbed them of their birth-rights, despoiled them of their property, and
 “ passed upon them a sentence of perpetual banishment—a government to which
 “ they had never submitted, and to which they owed neither fidelity nor alle-
 “ giance. The resemblance, therefore, exists only in your own imagination ;
 “ the difference is fundamental and radical.”

“ Perhaps the following passage may be sup-
 “ posed by some to be more remarkable for truth
 “ of statement, as to some facts, not altogether
 “ favourable to the Author’s general argument,
 “ than for the truth of the philosophy it would
 “ assert ; but which the Author, *like his master*
 “ Mr. BURKE, declines the labour of establishing.”

P. 86—“ You represent this mode of waging war against principles
 “ as “ a new and fatal principle of hostility.” The assertion is not very cor-
 “ rect, because Vattel, as we have seen, had expressly established the prin-
 “ ciple ; but if the practical application of it be new, whom have we to
 “ thank for it ? Those immaculate Republicans who appear, in your opinion,

' to be infallible, but who, in fact, are the first people, at least in modern
 ' times, that have rendered the assertion of such a principle of hostility neces-
 ' sary and unavoidable. Indeed, they were themselves fully aware, that their
 ' principles must be objects of resistance to all existing governments ; and they
 ' evidently intended that they should be so ; hence the President of the Con-
 ' vention, after the decree of the 16th had been passed in November 1792,
 ' alluding to the war which France had declared against the Emperor and the
 ' King of Prussia, observed, " PRINCIPLES ARE WAGING WAR AGAINST
 ' TYRANNY, which will fall under the blows of *philosophy*." This was
 ' perfectly true ; the disorganizing principles proclaimed by the French Go-
 ' vernment had declared, as they themselves repeatedly confessed, eternal war
 ' against *royalty*, that is, against every political institution or form of govern-
 ' ment which differed from their own. Of course, the regular Governments
 ' were compelled, in their own defence, to wage war against those principles.
 ' It was with them not an object of choice but a matter of necessity. The
 ' principles were avowedly the active aggressors ; they were the cause of hos-
 ' tility. Mr. Fox, indeed, whom you praise most extravagantly, apparently
 ' for no other reason than because his sentiments correspond with your own,
 ' was pleased to represent a contest pursued on these grounds as having *no*
 ' defined nor definable object. But he might as well tell me, that if a man
 ' threatened to take away my life, the judicial means I should adopt for se-
 ' curing myself against the effects of such threats, would have *no definable*
 ' object : and that, before I could have any lawful ground of action, I must
 ' wait until he had put his threats in execution. The object, in both cases,
 ' is to obtain reparation for a past act of aggression, and security against any
 ' future act of a similar nature.'

" We have given to this pamphlet more room
 " than its merit, in our judgment, seems to de-
 " mand ; but we are willing to give our readers
 " the fairest specimens of *ministerial* eloquence. It
 " has been remarked, that the disciples of the
 " school of WARBURTON never failed to display
 " his insolence, but seldom discovered any kindred
 " ability. Mr. BURKE, if not ' the founder of a
 " family,' is the founder of a school, and the scho-
 " lars of BURKE appear to resemble the disciples
 " of WARBURTON.

" Mr. ERSKINE's pamphlet was written with
 " *moderation and urbanity*, without acrimony, and
 " without

“ without invective. Yet Mr. G. has attacked
 “ him with all the virulence, but without the
 “ force, of Mr. BURKE. Mr. BURKE is a comet,
 “ which so dazzles us by its brilliancy, that in
 “ contemplating its splendor, we forget that it is
 “ shaking from its hair pestilence and war. Mr. G.
 “ is a common fire, noticed only for the fierceness
 “ of its rage, and its *indiscriminate destruction*.”

This Critic takes occasion to extend his remarks in a subsequent Number, in which my language is represented as *arrogant*, and my motives as *mean*; in which I am said to have betrayed, in my *trifling performance*, an *offensive spirit*, and to have expressed the feelings I “ either possessed or affected” in *bitter terms*. I was aware that, in attacking the Great Father of Democracy, Mr. LOCKE, I had administered a pill *too bitter* to be swallowed by those Critics, who regarded that philosopher as their grand idol, and who, in the warmth of their zeal, extended their veneration to his modern disciples, the Republicans of France. But it is not my intention to pursue the controversy in this place; the day will come, when the principles of LOCKE will be *analysed* by a more able pen; and his admirers will then have a fair opportunity of entering the lists in his defence.

I have now completed my task; the Public are in possession of the arguments on both sides of the question, and must decide between my opponents and me *en dernier resort*.



THE END.

